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             This 2 (partisan opinion) x 2 (content source) x 2 (content valence) factorial 
experiment investigates how partisans’ prior positions on two controversial issues of 
same sex marriage (N = 132) and guns on campus (N = 130) influence their 
perceptions about online content from either mainstream news source online (the 
Associated Press) or citizen blogs. Partisans’ perceptions of the content included 
perceived bias and credibility. This study also explores how the perceptions affect 
partisans’ online behaviors, including commenting on the content and subsequent 
information seeking.       
   Theoretically, the study tests ‘hostile media effect’ framework with a blog 
then investigates whether the effect differs when the same content appears on  a 
mainstream news source online (the Associated Press). The study also examines the 
relationship between the hostile media effect and partisans’ online behaviors. 
  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions with each 
containing stimuli manipulated as either pro or anti on the issues on either a 
mainstream news source online (the Associated Press) or a blog. 
               Similar to previous evidence of a relative hostile media effect in traditional 
printed news articles and national network broadcasts, this study found that online 
content also generated the effect regardless if content is produced by professional 
journalists or citizen bloggers. Partisans evaluated both mainstream online news and 
blog postings with opposite views as biased and less credible. Particularly, user-
generated content, blog postings, generated a stronger relative hostile media effect 
than mainstream online news.    
 In addition, hostile media effect appeared to motivate partisans to comment 
on content that opposes their position to correct perceived bias, and amplify their own 
position. This study also confirms partisans’ selective exposure to additional content 
that supports their position. However, the hostile media effect did not appear to 
enhance the tendency for selective exposure.   
 In their totality, partisan audiences’ perceptions of bias and credibility in 
mainstream online news and blog postings in a hostile direction, followed by 
commenting and more information seeking, seems to reinforce partisanship rather 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
                 The advent of the Internet has drastically increased the volume of 
information and communication in contemporary societies. Vast amounts of opinions 
and perspectives are now exposed to partisan audiences with differing opinions on 
controversial issues (Bruns, 2005). The Internet is a unique medium for public 
discussion through which partisans may examine and criticize diverse arguments 
(Benkler, 2006), and makes it possible for individuals to take collective action or 
mobilize around issues (Bruns, 2005). Based on these phenomena, optimists predicted 
that the Internet would contribute to the enhancement of democracy in a society (i.e. 
Kling 1996; Negroponte, 1998).  
                However, others have questioned the democratizing effect of the Internet, 
pointing out its polarizing rather than its homogenizing effects (Alstyne & 
Brynjolfsson, 2005). Skeptics argue that the Internet makes it easier for partisan 
audiences to search content in which they are interested and network with like-
minded people (Schonbach, de Waal & Lauf, 2005; Yardi & Boyd, 2010). 
Consequently, this exposes partisans to opinions that are similar to their own.      
              As optimists and skeptics paint different pictures about the effects of the 
Internet, understanding the democratizing effect of the Internet requires the answer to 
the question “how do partisan audiences process and respond to online content with a 
perspective different from their own?” 
                  To pursue the answer to this question, this study investigates the 




news sources and user-generated sources (i.e. blogs) both address controversial issues 
with opposing perspectives, the goal of this study is to examine how diverse content 
from different sources is perceived by partisan audiences online.    
Mainstream Media versus User-Generated Blogs  
 
               The web provides audiences with the tools to create and disseminate their 
own content (Gillmor, 2006). Internet resources and affordable digital equipments to 
produce content have made this possible (Bruns, 2005; Shirky, 2008).  
                However, unlike traditional news organizations with professional standards 
for journalists, there are no established ethical or professional guidelines for 
individuals to publish on the web (Jenkins, 2009). Individuals can produce content 
based on their own experiences and perspectives (Benkler, 2006). Virtually, any users 
can now post their opinions on the web without “conventional social restraints on the 
expression of unpopular opinions” (Chaffee et al., 2001, p.376). Therefore, user-
generated content often reflects a wider range of views on controversial issues with 
perspectives that can be different from professional journalists (Bruns, 2005). This 
outcome produces content with multiple perspectives online providing “a voice to a 
public, which is usually locked out of direct participation in traditional journalism” 
(Bruns, 2005, p.76).  
              As a result, content produced by both professional journalists of mainstream 
media and citizens (non-journalists) coexist and may compete for digital audiences. 
However, there has been little to no previous research about how audiences perceive a 
variety of content provided by mainstream media versus user-generated news sources. 




                For the purposes of this study, I define a ‘mainstream media’ as a large 
news provider that is primarily owned or subsidized by one or more conglomerates or 
mass media networks. A ‘mainstream medium’ reaches a large audience (1 million 
people or more), and operators of that medium invest considerable resources in their 
news operations.  
                 This study considers the Associated Press as part of the mainstream media. 
The Associated Press is a U.S based news wire service that provides continuous 
coverage of news from the U.S and around the world. The Associated Press is a news 
cooperative owned by American newspaper and broadcast members.1 In theory, such 
news services should self-consciously “avoid politically based editorial judgments in 
their news content” (Groeling & Baum, 2007). In this sense, the Associated Press can 
be regarded as a non-partisan news source compared to individual newspapers (i.e. 
the New York Times) and broadcast news organizations (i.e. Fox News).2
              In addition, this study tests online blogs as a user-generated news source. 
Web users publish their own content online, often using various social media such as 
blogs, microblogs such as Twitter, social networking sites such as Facebook, and 
video sharing sites like YouTube (Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2011).  These 
social media provide a set of online tools for generating content and supporting 
interaction between users (Hansen et al., 2011).   
 This is one 
reason why this study tests content provided by the Associated Press as a mainstream 
news source instead of content from newspapers or broadcasts.    
                                                 
1 See http://www.ap.org/company/about-us     
2 The reputation of the New York Times as a liberal source or that of Fox News as a conservative source 




               A blog can be a rich content platform for presenting in-depth information 
without limitations as compared to other social media. For example, Twitter limits a 
post to a maximum of 140 characters. Social networking sites focus on connecting 
friends and colleagues by creating personal information profiles. Video sharing sites 
provide applications for uploading video (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).   
              Audiences of blogs may be different from audiences for other social media. 
To illustrate, information on Twitter or Facebook is usually shared by networks of 
followers or friends. Conversely, information on blogs can be accessed by anyone 
unless bloggers want their postings to be public. In other words, information on blogs 
may build more general audiences beyond a group of followers or friends. Therefore, 
blogs and bloggers can be considered as producers of news content that can challenge 
mainstream media (Hansen et al., 2011). This explains why blogs are tested in this 
study as a user-generated news source. 
               A blog tested in this study is an independent and typically smaller provider 
of information and not a part of a larger mainstream conglomerate. Blogs content is 
generated by non-journalist citizens without any affiliation with professional news 
organizations. Bloggers would typically be viewed as ‘independent media’ sources, 
free from the influence of commercial interests, and more representative of an 
individual’s viewpoint.  
             Based on these explications, this study examines whether differences exist in 
audiences’ perceptions of bias and credibility in content from mainstream media (the 
Associated Press) versus user-generated blogs.  This study also explores the 




Bias and Credibility of Content 
 
  Traditionally, balance and fairness in reporting have been regarded as 
common journalistic practices and important assets in news coverage (Fico & Soffin, 
1995). However, it is not uncommon to encounter anecdotal evidences that 
individuals and groups believe news coverage and sources are biased. As examples, 
political parties complain that they received unfair treatment by the press especially 
during their campaigns and members of religious and racial groups frequently 
denounce news coverage as biased against their positions (Gunther, Miller, & 
Liebhart, 2009; Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 
1985).  
       According to the Pew Research Center, although 62 % of Americans believe 
“major news organizations do a good job covering all of the important news stories 
and subjects that matter to me,” 72% believe “most news sources today are biased in 
their coverage”(Purcell, Rainie, Mitchell, Rosenstiel, & Olmstead, 2010) (Figure1).  
 
Figure1.  Perceived bias of U.S. news coverage  





    Some say this dichotomy is fostered by partisanship.  “Liberals and 
Democrats are more likely to say that large news organizations do a good job on 
subjects that matter to them, while conservatives and Republicans are likely to 
perceive coverage as biased” (Purcell et al, 2010, p.6).   
   Credibility in reporting has also been a valued attribute in journalism 
(Gunther, 1992). Pew revealed how Democrats and Republicans evaluated credibility 
differently in identical news coverage. Some believed the news story was trustworthy. 
Others judged the same story to be untrustworthy (Purcell et al., 2010). These results 
suggest that perceived bias and credibility may not be an objective attribute of news 
coverage, but associated with individual factors such as partisanship.  
    Some scholars claim that partisans who perceive news coverage as 
untrustworthy or biased against their own opinions demonstrate a ‘hostile media 
effect’ (Gunther et al., 2001; Choi, Yang, & Chang, 2009). This effect posits that 
either a pro or anti opinion of partisans influences partisans to perceive bias and 
credibility in the coverage in different ways (Gunther et al., 2009).    
                 To date, the hostile media effect has been investigated using printed news 
articles or national network broadcasts produced by professional journalists of 
mainstream media. The effect has not been explored for mainstream versus user-
generated content online.  
                  This study responds by testing the framework of hostile media effect in 
mainstream news and user-generated blog postings. For doing so, the study measures 
how partisan audiences rate bias and credibility in identical news content supplied by 




Commenting and Information Seeking Behavior 
 
  The web provides technical tools for users to interact with content. Users 
frequently express their opinions publicly by commenting on the content read online. 
This makes it possible for audiences to participate in ongoing discussion about 
controversial issues (Bruns, 2005). Most web pages also provide hyperlinks to related 
content, which offer audiences the option to select more content that is interesting to 
them.  
  Research has shown that 25% of Internet users have commented on an online 
news story or blog (Purcell et al., 2010). Many more (75%) believe that links to 
related content is an important web feature. Although commenting and clicking links 
to related content are now common activities on the web, users’ motivations for - and 
 effects of - these activities have not been empirically explored in the context of 
controversial issues. This study investigates partisan audiences’ commenting and 
information seeking as behavioral consequences of the hostile media effect.   
Goals For This Study 
 
   One goal of this study is to extend previous research on the hostile media 
effect by testing it with controversial issues online and user-generated content (i.e. 
blogs). The study then explores if a hostile media effect occurs when the same 
content appears as professioanlly-produced news (i.e. the Associated Press). A 
second goal of this study is to examine the relationships between partisans’ 
perceptions of a controversial content and their online behaviors, including their 




                 The first step to achieve these goals is explications of concepts  and the 
theorectical framework (Table 1).  
 
Concepts   Bias, Credibility, Online behavior 
Theory Hostile Media Effect 
Relative Hostile Media Effect 
 
Table 1. Concepts and theoretical framework of this study  
Dissertation Organization 
 
                Beginning with chapter two, the concepts of perceived bias, credibility, and 
online behavior are explicated. Chapter three summarizes the theory of hostile media 
effect and discusses audiences’ involvement and the perceived reach of information 
as predictors of hostile media effect. Psychological dimensions underlying the effect, 
such as defferent standards, selective categorization, and selective recall are also 
addressed.  
               Chapter four details the research method including the partisan participants, 
stimuli, instruments, and experimental procedures employed in this study. Chapter 
five presents the results and chapter six discusses the theoretical, practical, and 
democratic implications of hostile media effect in the digital age. Chapter six also 
proposes directions for future research.   
 
                 All of this work is conducted in the context of two controversial issues that 
includes same sex marriage and guns on campus. Previous studies have tested hostile 




modified foods (Gunther & Schmitt, 2004; Gunter & Liebhart, 2006; Gunther et al., 
2009), the use of primates in laboratory research (Gunther & Chia, 2001), the 1997 
United Parcel Service strike (Christen, Kannaovakun,  & Gunther, 2002), presidential 
debates (Richardson, Huddy, & Morgan, 2008), global warming (Kim, 2010) and 
sports news (Arpan & Raney, 2003), but no known study has compared the effects of 
controversial content about same sex marriage and guns on campus provided by 
mainstream news sources versus blogs. 
The Issue of Same Sex Marriage    
                
              Same sex marriage in the United States is not endorsed by the federal 
government. However, individual states, including: Connecticut, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont, Washington along with 
the District of Columbia have succeeded in the legalization of same sex marriage.3
               With the signature of Maryland’s Governor on a same sex marriage bill on 
March 1, 2012, Maryland became the eighth state to legalize same sex marriage. 
Davis (2012) noted that while supporters of the bill erupted into applause after the bill 
was signed, opponents immediately started to work on overturning it by gathering 
petition signatures for a referendum. The battle over same sex marriage, at least in 
Maryland, is likely to come down to the ballot (Duncan, 2012).                     
  
              As the debate about same sex marriage has grown to a national political issue 
(Masci, 2009), the U.S. public remains divided. A series of Gallup polls (Figure 2) 




                                                 





 Support allowing same sex marriage  Oppose allowing same sex marriage 
 
 
Figure 2. Public opinion about same sex marriage 2009 to 2011  




                 According to Masci (2009), supporters of same sex marriage argue that gay 
and lesbian couples should be treated no differently than heterosexual couples. 
Supporters contend that same sex couples do not have any basic rights and privileges 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples. These privileges range from the sharing of health 
and pension benefits to hospital visitation rights (Masci, 2009).  
      Conversely, opponents maintain that a marriage between a man and a 
woman is the foundation of a healthy society. Opponents contend that only traditional 
marriage can lead to stable families in which children grow up to be productive adults 
(Masci, 2009). Opponents claim that allowing same sex marriage will adversely 
affect the institution of marriage, which has already been damaged by high divorce 
rates and a significant number of illegitimate children (Masci, 2009). The second 
controversial issue tested in this study is guns on campus. 
 
 
                                                 




The Issue of Guns on Campus 
 
                In March, 2012, a University of Maryland student, Alexander Song, posted 
an online threat of shooting on campus.5 Song wrote that he was going on a rampage 
to “kill enough people to make it to national news.”6  Reports about this online 
posting triggered campus crime alerts and Song’s arrest.7
                This scare followed previous attacks involving guns on other campuses.  In 
the aftermath of gun violence on campuses such as Virginia Tech, some states now 
permit college students and professors to carry weapons on campus. Utah, for 
example, allows students to carry a concealed gun if students have the proper permit. 
In Colorado, several colleges now permit licensed handguns on campus.
  
8 More 
recently, Texas approved concealed handgun licenses for weapons in public college 
buildings and classrooms.9 Similar measures have been considered in Arizona, 
Tennessee, Michigan, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Florida, Nebraska and Mississippi.10
               As the number of states allowing guns on campus increased, the controversy 
over the issue intensified. Opponents claim that if guns are allowed, “students and 
faculty would live in fear of classmates and colleagues, not knowing who might pull a 
gun over a poor grade, broken romance or drunken argument.”
 
11
                                                 
5 Umd. student Alexander Song, arrested after threatening ‘shooting rampage’ on College Park 
campus, ABC News, March 11, 2012 
 Gun proponents 
argue that Virginia Tech’s gun-free ‘safe zone’ policy actually endangered students, 
6  University of Maryland student charged in rampage threat, USA Today, March 12, 2012. 
7 According to The Washington Times (March 12, 2012), police did not find any weapons in his dorm 
room or his family’s home.   
8 Will guns make college campuses safer?, Washington Examiner, February 27, 2011 
9 Guns on campus gets first approval in Texas, CBS News, March 17, 2011 
10 States Consider Allowing Guns on Campus, Fox Business,  February 23, 2011 




not made them safer.12 Proponents contend that allowing guns on campus is “a self-
defense measure to prevent violent campus crime.”13
                  As the controversies over marriage and guns continue, professional 
journalists report the issues while bloggers – often with partisan opinions – post their 
content online. As a result, audiences on both sides of the issues are exposed to online 
content with a valence different from their own. Therefore, the coverage of same sex 
marriage and guns on campus in mainstream news sites versus blogs provide a novel 
platform for new explorations of the hostile media effect. 
  
                To investigate, this study first explicates the concepts of perceived bias and 
credibility in content. This study also conceptualizes users’ online behaviors 



















                                                 
12 MSU sticks to guns on firearms policy, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, December 5, 2007 









   Perceived bias in news coverage has incited debates among media scholars, 
journalists, and audiences alike. These debates have triggered a number of empirical 
studies about bias in news. The outcome is a variety of definitions for bias. McQuail 
(1992) wrote that bias refers to a systematic tendency to favor one side or position 
over another side or position. Entman (2007) defined bias as consistent patterns in the 
framing of mediated communication that promote the influence of one side in 
conflicts by supporting the interests of particular holders or seekers of political 
power. Bias in news coverage was also defined as “any forms of preferential and 
unbalanced treatment or favoritism, toward a political or social issue (e.g. pro-choice 
or pro-life) or political party” (Lee, 2005, p.45). Based on these definitions, previous 
bias studies analyzed news of mainstream news organizations to investigate if the 
news is biased or not.  
Bias in News Coverage   
      Fico, Freedman, & Love (2006) suggested two types of bias in news as either 
structural bias or partisan bias. Structural bias results from journalistic news values, 
work routines, organizational resource, and news organizations’ dependencies on 
other institutions (Fico & Freedman, 2008a). Partisan bias results from journalists’ 
political orientations violating professional norms that mandate impartiality (Fico et 




                   Fico and colleague (2008a) provided evidence of partisan bias in a 
content analysis of newspaper stories covering eleven U.S Senate races in 2006. The 
researchers found that the majority of stories favored Democratic and other liberal 
candidates. Tan & Weaver (2010) also found fluctuation of liberal and conservative 
citation bias in the New York Times between 1956 and 2004.   
     In contrast, other studies found little bias in news coverage. Fico, Zeldes, 
Carpenter, & Diddi (2008b) found little evidence of partisan bias in the daily election 
segments of CBS News and Fox News during the 2004 presidential election. 
Generally, CBS News has been considered as a liberal news source, whereas Fox 
News has been regarded as a conservative news source (Fico et al., 2008b). 
Therefore, results of the study were contrary to expectations which Fox and CBS 
news are most likely to show partisan bias (Fico et al., 2008b).  
              A meta-analysis of 59 quantitative studies reviewed data related to bias in 
presidential election campaigns since 1948 (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000). Analyses 
focused on three types of bias including: 1. Gatekeeping bias, which is the preference 
for selecting stories from one party or the other, 2. Coverage bias for addressing the 
relative amounts of coverage each party receives, and 3.Statement bias for focusing 
on the favorability of coverage toward one party or the other. Researchers found no 
significant bias of any kind in newspaper, news magazines, and television network 
news (D’Alessio et al., 2000).       
             Even though previous research has failed to provide consistent results for bias 
in news coverage, the majority of the U.S public still perceive that most news 




bias in news coverage and audiences’ perceived bias (Ho, Binder, Becker, Moy, 
Scheufele, Brossard, & Gunther, 2011). If that is true, perceived bias is neither 
absolute nor objective but subjective depending on audiences’ individual factors such 
as partisanship.   
The Non-Absolute Conceptualization of Bias 
   Gangs (1979) identified bias with ‘distortion’, meaning news coverage can be 
perceived as distorted (biased) in relation to a specified standard of non-distortion 
(non-biased). Different audiences base the standards of non-distortion on different 
reality and value judgments (Gangs, 1979). According to the researcher, standards for 
bias cannot be absolute or objective. “When the news lives up to one standard, it may 
then be distorted in relation to a different one” (Gangs, 1979, p. 305). The implication 
is that those who have different standards of non-distortion (non-biased) may judge 
bias in the same news coverage differently. 
    Therefore, based on previous studies by Gangs (1979), Ho et al. (2011), and 
Lee (2005), this study conceptualizes bias as an individual’s subjective perception 
that content, a source, or an author provides preferential and unbalanced information 
for a controversial issue, regardless of any real biases portrayed in the news coverage.  
 
Credibility 
   Traditionally, credibility in mass media has been defined as an attribute of 
news coverage or sources. However, using a national survey, Gunther (1992) found 
that audiences’ characteristics were the strongest predictor of perceived credibility in 




audience’s involvement with issues, appeared more important than media attributes. 
Similar to perceived bias, perceived credibility, can also be considered a response by 
a given audience to given content (Gunther, 1992). Accordingly, this study 
conceptualizes perceived credibility as a subjective perception of the online audience, 
not as an objective property of the content. 
   A source of given content, its author, and the content itself contribute to the 
overall perceived credibility of the content (Kiousis, 2001). Based on previous 
credibility studies (Choi, Watt, & Lynch, 2006; Kiousis, 2001), this study 
conceptualizes perceived credibility as the three dimensions of:  1. Source credibility, 
2. Author credibility, and 3. Content credibility (Figure 3).   
 
                          Source credibility   
                          Author credibility                            Credibility 
                          Content credibility   
                
Figure 3. Conceptualizations of this study’s credibility 
                Specifically, source credibility describes the trustworthiness or believability 
of a mainstream news site versus a blog. Author credibility is the perception about the 
producers of content (i.e. professional journalist versus citizen blogger), and content  
credibility relates to evaluations of the controversial information presented (Metzger, 
Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & Maccann, 2003).14
                                                 
14 Metzger et al (2003) categorized credibility as message credibility, source credibility, and media 
credibility. Even though this study’s credibility categories are based on their study, this study uses 
different terms such as content credibility, author credibility, and source credibility for more clarifying.    





    Fundamentally, source credibility is one’s perceived credibility of a media 
channel through which an author transmits a message (Kiousis, 2001). Source 
credibility can be defined “as perceptions of a news channel’s believability, as 
distinct from individual author, media organizations, or the content of the news itself” 
(Bucy, 2003, p.248).   
   Web audiences can view content from mainstream news organizations and 
citizen-based blogs at basically the same time. Therefore, the web can be categorized 
as a media channel with content supplied by either mainstream news organizations or 
individuals. Accordingly, this study explicates source credibility as an audience’s 
evaluation of believability and trustworthiness of mainstream news sites versus 
citizen blogs. 
Author Credibility  
   Some have defined author credibility as “how different communicator’s 
characteristics can influence the processing of messages” (Kiousis, 2001, p.382). 
Expertise and trustworthiness have been included as dimensions of author credibility 
(Hovland & Weiss, 1951). “Expertise referred to a communicator’s qualifications or 
ability to know the truth about a topic, whereas trustworthiness was conceptualized as 
perceptions of the communicator’s motivation to tell the truth about a topic” (Metzger 
et al., 2003, p.297).  
    In this study, author credibility is explicated as judgments made by audiences 





  Content Credibility  
   Scholars have treated content credibility as audiences’ perceptions of message 
characteristics and information quality (Metzger et al., 2003). When audiences do not 
have enough information about an author, the content becomes a more important 
factor than the author in assessment of credibility (Eastin, 2001).   
  Metzger et al. (2003) suggested three factors of content credibility as: 
 1. Content structure, 2. Message or information in content, and 3. Delivery or 
presentation style.  Audiences evaluate content based on content structure, which is 
whether the content is organized or unorganized. The trustworthiness or quality of the 
content, and the way in which the content is presented by an author, can also 
influence content credibility judgments.   
    Content structure and presentation style describe a content’s format. This 
study focuses on the information provided in the content rather than the content’s 
format. Therefore, this study explicates content credibility as an audience’s evaluation 
of trustworthiness and quality of the information presented in online content produced 
by either a journalist or citizen blogger.  
              Table 2 summarizes the concepts of source credibility, author credibility and 











Audiences’ perceived credibility of mainstream news sites 
versus citizen blogs 
 
Author Credibility Audiences’ perceived credibility of professional journalists 
versus citizen bloggers 
Content Credibility Audiences’ perceived credibility of information presented 
in online news stories versus blog postings 
 
Table 2. Explications of source credibility, author credibility  
and content credibility 
 
      
Based on the conceptualizations of bias and credibility, this study asks:     
  
 RQ1: How do partisans’ opinions influence their evaluation of online 





RQ2: How do partisans’ opinions influence their evaluation of blog 
posting produced by non-journalists in terms of bias and credibility? 
 
 
             This study also examines the roles of source and partisan opinion in the 
audiences’ evaluations of identical content presented by either mainstream news sites 
or user-generatned blogs. This examination seeks to answer the question: 
RQ3: How do sources and partisans’ opinions influence the 
evaluation of identical content from a blog and a mainstream news site 




Audiences’ Online Behaviors  
     Citizens no longer just read content on the web. Reading mainstream online 
news and blog postings could prompt other audiences’ activities for interacting with 




            Commenting          Information Seeking  
Online Behaviors 
affect how audiences learn and perceive the content (Yaros, 2011). Based on this 
assumption, audiences’ online behaviors of this study are conceptualized as 
commenting and further information seeking behavior following exposure to the 
content (Figure 4). 
 
                              
                                                    
      
    
                                      
Figure 4. Conceptualizations of this study’s online behaviors 
 
Commenting Behavior  
   Traditional media, such as printed newspapers, ‘transmit’ content from a 
source to a reader. Arguably, any ‘interactivity’ provided by printed newspapers was 
delayed. For example, to interact with articles on printed newspapers, readers 
typically mailed their opinions, thoughts, and feelings to the newspaper for printing in 
subsequent issues. Even then, space limitations often prevented publication of all 
letters from readers forcing editors to print only selected letters (Rosenthal, 1969).  
  The advent of the Internet has resulted in two-way communication in which 
messages flow bilaterally (Schultz, 1999). Interactive features of the Internet make 
possible a sequence of messages that relate to each other, with later messages 




can be followed by instant comments from any web user who voluntarily posts them.  
Both mainstream news sites and blogs typically allow online audiences to post 
comments. In many cases, comments are posted without editing.  
       By posting comments online, audiences, in effect, engage with a 
‘conversation’ with original authors of content and other audience members who 
comment on the content to add other perspectives to the content they read (Bruns, 
2005).  Schuth et al. (2007) analyzed comments in news by counting the number of 
sentences per comment. The researchers found that the quality of comments were 
unexpectedly high, suggesting that some comments could be a valuable source of 
information on the web.  
    The opportunity for web audiences to comment on content also facilitates a 
discussion structure in comments (Schuth et al., 2007). According to Bruns (2005), 
audiences often gain an understanding of news events through the ongoing 
conversations or debates posted in comments. Bruns (2005) argued that such a 
continuing conversation could change the nature of news stories from ‘finished 
stories’ to ‘unfinished stories’.  In this sense, commenting behavior can represent the 
online news story as a starting point for further discussions between content 
producers and audience members (Bruns, 2005). Accordingly, this study explicates 
commenting as an audience’s activity for expressing opinions, thoughts, and feelings 
about content read on the web.   
             Based on this explication, this study examines the relationships between 




controversial issues from mainstream news sites and citizen blogs. This study seeks 
answers to a question that asks: 
RQ4:  How do partisans’ opinions influence their commenting 
behavior online? 
 
Information Seeking Behavior  
     According to Matusiak (2006), information seeking is a fundamental human 
activity in the process of gathering information and building knowledge. The 
researcher considered information seeking as “a process in which humans 
purposefully engage in order to change their state of knowledge” (Marchionini, 1995, 
p.5). Information seeking includes “activities between the recognition of information 
need and the acquisition of relevant information.” (Rice, McCreadie, & Chang, 2001, 
p.2).  
     The transformation of news from print to the web has obviously influenced 
audiences’ information seeking behavior. Printed newspapers construct a hierarchy of 
stories by arranging them in order of importance (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002). In 
this structure, readers conduct page-by-page searches looking for stories of interest to 
them. During this search process, readers are exposed to stories that may not be 
interesting to them. This suggests that, to some extent, print journalists can have some 
control of audiences' exposure to content. 
    The web, however, provides hyperlinks that reference other content that web 
users can follow nonlinearly. Hyperlinks can help to reshape how audiences seek and 
select online content and make it easier to search for and select stories that are 




to control their own interests, and less likely to follow the cues of news editors and 
producers” (Tewksbury, 2006, p. 694). In other words, web audiences typically 
determine their own ‘path’ when seeking more content. When this occurs, the web 
facilitates greater individual control over content selection as compared to traditional 
mainstream media (Althaus &Tewksbury, 2002).   
   Based on this discussion, this study explicates information seeking as an 
audience’s activity for selecting related content after viewing original content to gain 
more information. The relationship between audiences’ opinions and further 
information seeking behavior is examined by asking:  
RQ5: How do partisans’ opinions influence their further information 
seeking behavior online?  
 
 
  To explore the roles of audiences’ perceptions of content read in subsequent 
information seeking, this study also asks:  
RQ6: How do partisans’ perceptions of content they read influence 
their further information seeking behavior online? 
 
 
   To investigate these questions, this study tests the theoretical framework of 









Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework: Hostile Media Effect 
 
             
             Early media effect studies employed a ‘hypodermic needle’ model suggesting 
media ‘inject’ audiences with content that prompts particular responses (Morley, 
1989). This suggested that messages are directly received and wholly accepted by 
audiences.  
    Another perspective from the uses and gratification paradigm, focused on the 
uses of media, and user satisfactions from using media. These were closely related 
with users’ motives and needs (McQuail, 2005). This school considered the active 
engagement of audiences with media and developed variability of responses and 
interpretations (Morley, 1989). The different responses or interpretations were 
associated with individual differences (i.e. personality, psychology, etc.). From this 
perspective, there is no longer a given effect of a message on a homogeneous mass 
audience.  
   At the same time, Morley (1989) argued that although the uses and 
gratification approach raised questions about different interpretations, it often failed 
to provide sufficient sociological and cultural perspectives.  
   Alternatively, Hall’s encoding/decoding model provided social and cultural 
explanations for audiences’ differing interpretations of media messages (Morley, 
1989). Hall suggested the model of a communication circuit operating in its social 
context, noting ideological and cultural conditions of different audiences play an 
important role in their perceptions of media messages (Hall, 1980).  




audience model by exploring individual and social factors. An audience is no longer a 
mass that receives intended media message. Instead, ideological, economic, and 
cultural backgrounds of audiences have influenced their diverse perceptions of media 
content (i.e. Morley, 1980; Liebes & Katz, 1990; Ang, 1996), which leads to the 
contemporary theory of hostile media effect. 
               Hostile media effect describes a partisan’s perceptions of news coverage. 
The theory addresses factors that influence partisan perceptions of news coverage 
about a controversial issue and posits that different points of view influence partisans 
to perceive content in different ways (Gunther et al., 2009). Specifically, hostile 
media effect describes the tendency for partisans with opinions toward a divisive 
issue to perceive seemingly ‘balanced news’ as biased against their own opinion 
(Gunther et al., 2001; Choi et al., 2009).  
             Hostile media effect provides the theoretical foundation for this investigation 
of how audiences’ positions on same sex marriage and guns on campus influence 
their perceptions of content presented by either mainstream news sites or citizen 
blogs. The effect is further tested to see if partisans’ opinions and perceptions also 
affect their online behaviors, such as commenting and subsequent information 
seeking.       
                   Earlier research by Vallone et al. (1985) produced evidences that 
opposing partisans might agree that news coverage is biased, but disagree on the 
direction of such bias. Results of a survey before the 1980 presidential election 
showed that partisan Republicans and Democrats perceived news coverage as being 




      Inspired by these results, Vallone and his colleagues exposed pro-Israeli and 
pro-Arab students to television news programs about the 1982 Beirut massacre. 
Results suggested that both sides regarded the programs as biased in favor of the 
opposite side, and that the views of the program’s editors were unfavorable to those 
of the partisans. The researchers concluded that “rather than perceiving confirmation 
and support, partisans frequently claim to perceive hostile bias, even in news 
coverage that most nonpartisans find even-handed and objective” (Vallone et al., 
1985, p.578).  
Predictors of Hostile Media Effect 
 Perceived Reach 
                 The counterpart to hostile media effect is ‘biased assimilation’ (Vallone et 
al., 1985). Biased assimilation describes an individual’s tendency to perceive reported 
information as supportive, rather than opposed, to the individual’s opinion (Lord & 
Lepper, 1979). Several studies have demonstrated biased assimilation when exposing 
partisans to research reports (see, Lord et al, 1979; Boysen & Vogel; 2007; Munro & 
Ditto, 1997; Plous, 1991; Mchoskey, 1995).  
   Gunther et al. (2004) explained the contradiction of biased assimilation and 
hostile media effect by the notion of ‘perceived reach’. The researchers argued that 
biased assimilation studies used research reports with low levels of audience exposure 
or reach. In other words, participants in biased assimilation studies assumed that the 
relatively small audience for the research was the participants themselves. 
Conversely, hostile media effect studies used national network broadcasts or 




                  Based on the differentiation of perceived reach, participants of biased 
assimilation and hostile media effect studies may have significantly different 
perceptions about the influence of media. A participant exposed to media with low 
levels of reach generally considers the influence to be directed to him or herself, 
which results in biased assimilation. A participant exposed to media with high levels 
of reach assumes the content influences broader audiences. Partisans could assume 
that news coverage reaching a larger audience could more easily influence the 
opinions of others. This is why some scholars argue that mass media’s broader reach 
and potential influence are more likely to generate the hostile media effect (Gunther 
et al., 2004; Gunther et al., 2006; Gunther et al., 2009). If that is true, the hostile 
media effect is also related to the so-called ‘third person effect.’ 
Third Person Effect  
                The third person effect posits that individuals exposed to mass media 
messages believe the messages influence other audience members more than 
themselves (Davison, 1983). This predicts that people overestimate the influence of 
mass media on others (Davison, 1983).           
                 Some scholars consider the third person effect to be “a human tendency to 
see the world through an optimistic or self-serving lens” (Gunther & Mundy, 1993, 
p.58). This means the third person effect is based on the tendency for people to think 
they may be smarter or more informed than others. When this occurs, people consider 
others to be more vulnerable to the media’s influence.  
               Not all information, however, produces a third person effect. Gunther et al. 




found that information with harmful outcomes was more closely related with the third 
person effect. Participants perceived the beneficial information to have the same 
effect on others as on themselves.    
               Perloff (1989) replicated the Vallone et al. (1985)’s study to examine 
relationships between the third person and hostile media effects. Pro-Israeli, pro-
Palestinian, and non-partisan control groups viewed the same news video about the 
1982 war in Lebanon and perceived that other ‘neutral’ viewers would describe their 
side as an aggressor and the other side as a victim. Participants also predicted that the 
news would influence the opinions of ‘neutral’ viewers to become more unfavorable 
toward their side, but more favorable toward the opposite side.   
   Hostile media effect has also been found to reverse third person effects 
(Gunther et al., 2004). Although people who view undesirable messages in mass 
media think the messages have a greater influence on others, partisans who perceive 
information to be reaching a mass audience often judge that information to be 
undesirable. Gunther et al. (2004) noted that even with the reversed process, the logic 
of hostile media effect is similar to the third person effect because partisans consider 
others to be more vulnerable to undesirable influences of media than themselves. 
This, Gunther argued, can depend on the reach of a media source or information.    
High Reach versus Low Reach Media      
               For investigating the role of perceived reach of information in hostile media 
effects, Gunther et al. (2004) hypothesized that “if partisans consider information 




partisans are prompted to consider influences on others, they will see the same 
information as biased in a hostile direction” (Gunther et al., 2004, p.58).  
                To test this hypothesis, partisans of genetically modified foods were 
presented with identical information from either a news organization or a student 
essay. Participants who read the news story perceived that content as biased against 
their opinion. Participants who read the student essay considered the identical content 
as supportive of their opinion (Gunther et al., 2004). In sum, media perceived with a 
high reach produced a hostile media effect and the student essay with low reach 
produced biased assimilation. Gunther and his colleagues concluded that this showed 
that hostile media effect can be influenced significantly by perceived reach of source 
and information.     
               Gunther and his colleagues extended this work by comparing perceived 
reach of a source with different authors (a student versus a journalist). They found 
that the perceived reach of source and author both independently contributed to 
hostile media effect (Gunther et al., 2006). In the student-as-author condition, 
opposing groups perceived the valence of the content similarly.  In the journalist-as-
author condition, however, participants evaluated identical content as hostile toward 
their position. This outcome reinforced the role of perceived reach in generating a 
hostile media effect.  
             Gunther et al. (2009) further explored the role of perceived reach in 







Figure 5.   The assimilation-contrast continuum 
(Source: Gunther et al., 2009, p.748, Reprinted with permission) 
 
   Scholars noted that depending on audiences’ perceived reach of content, their 
perceptions of the content can “fall anywhere on a continuum from the assimilation - 
contrast (hostile) continuum” (Gunther et al., 2009, p.748, Figure 5). According to 
Gunther et al. (2009), partisans focus on congenial content in the low reach condition 
of a student essay, which generates the assimilation. However, in high reach 
condition of mass media, partisans consider the potential influence of the content on 
others, which makes the disagreeable content more salient than the supportive 
content. This produces the hostile media effect (Gunther et al., 2009).    
             Perceived reach isn’t the only predictor of hostile media effect. Audience 
involvement must also be considered and social judgment theory helps to explain 
why. 
Audience Involvement  
 
 An experimental study by Giner-Sorolla et al. (1993) investigated effects of 
news about the Israel-Palestinian conflict and abortion. They found a hostile media 
effect from news about the Israel-Palestinian conflict but did not find the effect from 
news about abortion. Pro-life and pro-choice partisans showed only a weak hostile 




was so, the study demonstrated that participants’ involvement with an issue could be 
another significant predictor of hostile media effect.  
           The relationship of involvement with an issue and a partisan’s perception of 
content about a controversial issue might also be explained by social judgment 
theory. 
 Social Judgment Theory             
  Social judgment theory posits that different levels of involvement with a given 
issue can be related to different levels of acceptance, rejection or non-commitment for 
news coverage about an issue. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall (1981) states that latitude 
of acceptance refers to “the position on an issue (or toward an object) that is most 
acceptable, plus other acceptable positions” (p.24). Latitude of rejection is defined as 
“the most objectionable position on the same issue, plus other objectionable 
positions” (p.24). Latitude of non-commitment is “those positions not categorized as 
either acceptable or objectionable in some degree” (p.24).  
   Sherif and his colleagues (1981) provided empirical support of the social 
judgment theory in a study of the 1960 presidential election. The researchers exposed 
both Republicans and Democrats to nine statements ranging from an extreme 
conservative to an extreme liberal position. Participants indicated their levels of 
involvement with the election issue as most extreme, extreme, moderate and mild. 
Results indicated that participants with high involvement with an issue tended to have 
wider latitudes of rejection of statements about the issue. Less involved participants 
had relatively narrow latitudes of rejection but wider latitudes of acceptance or non-




               According to Sherif et al. (1981), the latitude differences stemmed from 
one’s own perception of what is acceptable or objectionable. The researchers noted 
that individuals had their own evaluative categories for what is acceptable or 
objectionable and that the number of categories varied with levels of involvement. 
The more highly involved people are, the fewer the categories for what is acceptable 
and the more for what is objectionable (Sherif et al., 1981).   
  Sherif and his colleagues concluded that the more the audience is involved 
with an issue, the more their position anchors their judgment of coverage about the 
issue. In other words, one’s position serves as a yardstick for evaluating coverage. 
When a coverage is opposite from an audience’s position, the coverage is perceived 
as “unreasonable, propagandistic, false, and even obnoxious” (Sherif et al., 1981, 
p.227). But when a coverage is congenial with an audience’s position, the coverage is 
evaluated as “more truthful, more factual, less biased and tolerable” (Sherif et al., 
1981, p.227).  
        Gunther (1992) tested social judgment theory by exploring the influence of 
issue involvement on perceptions of news coverage. Gunther found that highly 
involved individuals tended to have more fixed positions for an issue and considered 
their position to be correct even when they encounter dissonant opinions. Highly 
involved people process information by:  “1. Taking consonant information (that 
which falls in a narrow range of acceptance) as veridical, and embracing it, and 2. 
Judging counter-attitudinal information to be the product of a biased, misguided or 




                 In sum, social judgment theory suggests that for those highly involved with 
an issue, news coverage about the issue tends to fall into the latitude of rejection, 
which increases the possibility for hostile media effect (Choi et al., 2009).   
                 Although involvement appears to be a significant factor for hostile media 
effect, there is little agreement on how to operationalize the concept of involvement. 
Some studies used group membership while other studies used opinion extremity as 
indicators of audiences’ involvement with an issue (Gunther et al., 2009). 
                 For example, data from a study commissioned by the American Society of 
Newspapers Editors (ASNE) showed that group membership was associated with 
public perception of media coverage. A person who identified with a particular group 
was more likely to evaluate the coverage as biased against his or her group (Gunther, 
1992).  “To the extent that it captures a person’s personal identity and deeper forms of 
commitment, identification with a group can define a fundamental sense of 
involvement” (Gunther, 1992, p.152).   
      Others used opinion extremity as an indicator of involvement, focusing on 
partisans who express strong or extreme opinion toward an issue as highly involved 
individuals (i.e. Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004; Vallone et al, 1985). Based on 
the previous work, this study uses both group membership and opinion extremity as 
indicators of involvement with the issues of same sex marriage and guns on campus.  
      Besides the predictors of perceived reach and audience involvement for 
hostile media effect, we must also understand the mechanisms producing the effect. 




Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Hostile Media Effect  
 
                A 1985 study by Vallone and his colleagues postulated that two 
mechanisms explain hostile media effect. The first is audiences’ selective evaluation 
and the second is their selective perception.    
     To illustrate, pro-Arab and pro-Israeli subjects ‘saw’ different content 
within the same news program. Pro-Arab and pro-Israeli subjects reported different 
percentages of the program’s references to Israel as either favorable or unfavorable. 
Both groups also evaluated differently the perceived fairness and objectivity of the 
program. Based on these findings, researchers concluded that both selective 
evaluation and perception appear to contribute to the hostile media effect.    
                Studies by Giner-Sorolla et al. (1993) and Schmitt et al.(2004) expanded  
Vallone et al.’s approach by proposing the three mechanisms of: 1. Different 
standards, 2. Selective categorization, and 3. Selective recall (Figure 6).  
                In terms of different standards, partisans may agree that balanced news has 
an equal number of content to support each side, but partisans may have other 
standards for evaluating the news. For example, partisans perceive specific content 
that supports their position to be more accurate than it is for the other side. Partisans 
also perceive content opposing their position to be invalid and irrelevant. Therefore, 
since balanced news often includes statements opposing one position, partisans often 
judge that news to be in favor of the other side (Giner-Sorolla et al.1993; Schmitt et 
al., 2004).    
               Selective recall suggests that partisans pay more attention to unfavorable 




salient. It leads them to perceive that the news is biased against their position (Giner-
Sorolla et al.1993; Schmitt et al., 2004).     
       In addition, although partisans may recall the same content from news, 
partisans categorize the content differently. Consequently, partisans categorize more 
news as unfavorable and tend to judge even neutral content to be unfavorable. This 
describes the notion of selective categorization (Giner-Sorolla et al.1993; Schmitt et 
al., 2004). 
 
Figure 6. Three mechanisms explaining the hostile media effect 
*anti (A), neutral (N), pro (P) content.   
(Source: Schmitt et al, 2004, p.625, 626, Reprinted with permission) 
 
                  Giner-Sorolla et al. (1993) proposed the causal model incorporating these 
three mechanisms and found that only the different standards mechanism explained 
hostile media effect. Selective recall and categorization was not observed among 




content that supported their position and categorized more content as supporting their 
position.   
                Schmitt et al. (2004) examined the three mechanisms with the two 
conditions of a newspaper article versus a student essay. As expected, hostile media 
effect was generated only for the newspaper article. The selective recall mechanism 
was not supported for either condition, but the different standards mechanism was 
found in both. Selective categorization appeared in only the newspaper article. In 
sum, whether partisans categorize statements in content as either favorable or 
unfavorable depended on the format in which the content was presented (in this case, 
a newspaper article versus a student essay). This result associated only selective 
categorization with hostile media effect. But there is an evidence for another form of 
hostile media effect, called ‘relative hostile media effect.’ 
Relative Hostile Media Effect 
 
              Previous hostile media effect studies exposed partisans to ‘neutral’ news 
about controversial issues and asked partisans to evaluate the news. The three 
required conditions for hostile media effect studies were: 1. A controversial issue, 2. 
Highly involved individuals, and 3. Neutral news (Choi et al., 2006)   
    Gunther et al. (2001) questioned the requirement of ‘neutral’ news, arguing 
that in reality, news is never completely neutral. The researchers argued that even 
disinterested observers can evaluate news as favorable toward a particular position.  
“Most of the journalists presumably believe they cleave to a professional standard of 
objectivity or balance, but most people in the media audience may not see it that way” 




removed the term ‘objectivity’ from its ethics code (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). This 
reflects that even professional journalists may perceive the concept of objectivity to 
be unrealistic. 
               Based on this argument, some researchers coined the term ‘relative hostile 
media effect’ using content with a particular position (i.e. pro or anti) rather than 
‘neutral’ news. In this case, when a partisan group sees other individuals evaluating 
news as favorable to the group, group members do not judge the news to be hostile to 
their points of view. But when most agree that news is unfavorable to the group, 
members evaluate the news as unfavorable relative to the other group (Gunther et al., 
2001). This describes a ‘relative hostile media effect.’  
                 The effect has been investigated with the controversial issue of using 
primates in scientific research. Partisan groups, one supporting animal rights and the 
other supporting the benefits of primate research, read stories that either supported 
primate research or animal rights. Those on both sides of the issue agreed that the 
pro-animal news story was biased toward animal right, but the pro-research members 
evaluated the news as more biased than pro-animal members. When both groups were 
exposed to news favoring primate research, animal right proponents perceived the 
content as more biased than supporters of primate research (Gunther et al., 2001).   
   A relative hostile media effect was also found in a national survey of the 
primate issue. Members from both sides agreed that coverage was generally 
unfavorable toward the use of primates in research. However, pro-primate research 
members perceived the coverage as significantly more unfavorable than pro-animal 




        In another national survey, Gunther & Christen (2002) tested the four 
issues of:  radon gas, genetically altered foods, extraterrestrial visits, and physician-
assisted suicide. Researchers found relative hostile effect in some but not all the 
issues, but noted that both sides of an issue have divergent perceptions of bias in a 
hostile direction. “Each will see media coverage differently, each in an unfavorable 
direction relative to the other” (Gunther et al., 2002, p.190).  
               Theoretically, the relative hostile media effect is identical to the original 
hostile media effect. By eliminating ‘neutral’ news, however, the relative hostile 
media effect is recognized to widen the scope of hostile media effect (Gunther et al., 
2001).        
     Unlike journalists with ethical and professional standards, web users (i.e. 
bloggers) do not have such standards or norms for posting content on the web 
(Jenkins 2009). User- generated content such as blog posting do not generally exhibit 
professional gatekeeping or editing processes (Johnson & Kaye, 2004). Therefore, 
web users can openly or freely express their strong or extreme viewpoints of specific 
interest (Johnson, Kaye, Bichard, & Wong, 2008). Web users disclose their biases by 
publishing their own content (Johnson et al., 2004). 
    Given the increasing number of online content with a clear valence, this 
study tests the relative hostile media effect online using content with particular 






Hostile Media Effect of Online Content  
 
               Previous studies have investigated traditional formats for content such as 
printed articles and national network broadcasts. Since a growing number of people15
     Synthesizing the previous studies, hypotheses in this study predict that 
partisan audiences will evaluate mainstream news differently in terms of bias, source 
credibility, author credibility, and content credibility. Specifically:  
 
have access to mainstream news online from news organizations’ sites, such as New 
York Times.com and CNN.com, this study extends the previous literature by testing 
the relative hostile media effect for content online. 
H1a: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will 
perceive the news as more biased than partisans with opinions 
congenial with the news. 
 
 H1b: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will 
perceive a mainstream source as less credible than partisans with 
opinions congenial with the news. 
 
H1c: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will 
perceive the author of the news as less credible than partisans with 
opinions congenial with the news. 
 
H1d: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will 
perceive the content of the news as less credible than partisans with 
opinions congenial with the news.   
 
               Prior to the web, news was produced by professional journalists at 
traditional news organizations and consumed by audiences. There was a distinction 
between the role of journalists and audiences. With emergence of the web, however, 
the roles have become blurred (Shirky, 2008). The declining prices of communication 
                                                 
15 Six in ten American adults (61%) get their news online on a typical day, and 71% of Americans get 
their news online at least occasionally. The Internet is now the third most-popular news platform 




tools such as computers and Internet networks helped – in part – ‘ordinary’ people to 
produce their own content (Benkler, 2006). Since every user can set up his or her own 
media outlet online, they can play the role traditionally assigned to journalists by 
reporting and analyzing events from their own perspectives (Benkler, 2006).  Web 
users have become both producers and consumers of content online (Bowman & 
Willis, 2003), which contributed, in part, to the growth of news outlets online (Shirky, 
2008).            
              The emergence of the web also provides a novel environment for testing the 
perceived reach of information, an important predictor of hostile media effect. If user-
generated content, such as a student essay, is posted on the web, it may reach a large 
audience beyond the classroom.    
  The blog was one of the first platforms to make it possible for individuals to 
publish online (Gillmor, 2006). Gillmor defines a blog as “an online journal 
comprised of links and postings in reverse chronological order” (p.29). The ease and 
appeal of blogging have inspired individuals to create their own content and then 
disseminate it online. A Pew survey showed the blog population has grown to about 
12% of all Internet users, and blog readers have jumped to 42% of the U.S. online 
population (Smith, 2008). These data indicate that blogs have grown as a medium 
with potentially high reach, an important predictor of hostile media effect.  
     Related to the perceived reach of blogs, Banning & Sweetser (2007) found 
evidence for the influence of blogs on large scale audience. They measured how 
audiences perceived the influence of blogs by comparing: personal blogs, media 




found to have the same perceived influence on audiences as traditional media. This 
suggests that blog audiences may perceive a blog as a source reaching large and broad 
audiences with large-scale influences on them. If this is so, blog postings would also 
be susceptible to hostile media effect. This study hypothesizes that user generated 
blog content will produce a relative hostile media effect in terms of perceived bias, 
and source, author, and content credibility in the same way that mainstream news 
does. Specifically:  
H2a: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive 
the posting as more biased than partisans with opinions congenial 
with the posting. 
 
H2b: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive 
the blog as a less credible source than partisans with opinions 
congenial with the posting.    
 
H2c: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive 
the author of the posting as less credible than partisans with opinions 
congenial with the posting.    
 
H2d: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive 
the content of the blog posting as less credible than partisans with 
opinions congenial with the posting. 
 
 
  There have been debates about how to evaluate blogs as a news source. Some 
argue that since blogs are not constrained by the ethical and professional standards of 
trained journalists, blogs are generally less credible and more biased than mainstream 
media with its checks and balances to ensure credibility (Mackay & Lowrey, 2007). 
Others argue that because blogs are independent from corporate interests, blogs are 




                 In response, media scholars have started to compare audiences' evaluations 
of blogs with those of mainstream media (i.e. Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Kiousis, 
2001; Johnson et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2008; Kim & Johnson, 2009).  
                For example, Johnson et al. (2004) surveyed blog users and found that they 
evaluated blogs as more credible and less biased than traditional media. Blog readers 
argued that blogs provided more depth and thoughtful content than mainstream 
media. Subsequently, Johnson et al. (2008) examined perceptions of blogs by 
politically interested web users in the U.S. They found that the users also viewed 
blogs as more credible and less biased than mainstream media.  
               Geer (2003) tested the effects of a source by showing participants a news 
story from either a mainstream site or a personal home page. The participants rated 
the content equally across the two conditions.  Mackey et al. (2007) replicated this 
finding with content displayed as online news, a journalist’s blog, or a citizen blog. 
No significant differences in participants’ evaluations were found suggesting no 
effect of news sources on evaluations of content.  
                So, while blog users and politically interested web users perceive blogs as a 
less biased and more credible source than mainstream media, general population 
showed no differences in their perceptions of blogs versus mainstream media. In the 
eyes of some, blogs have apparently achieved a status equal or close to that of 
mainstream media as a news source (Banning et al., 2007). However, previous studies 
did not consider individual factors in evaluations of identical content from different 
sources. This study fills that gap by applying audiences’ prior position to evaluations 




               Based on the previous discussions of relative hostile media effect, this study 
hypothesizes that partisans’ evaluations of identical content will be influenced by the 
level of agreement between a partisan’s opinion and the content’s valence (i.e. 
opinions either agreeing or disagreeing with the content’s valence). Specifically, 
whether a partisan’s opinion is congenial or opposite from a content’s valence will 
play a significant role compared to the content’s source in evaluations of bias, and 
source, author, and content credibility. Specifically: 
H3a:  Evaluations of bias will be influenced more by the level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than by 
source. 
 
H3b:  Evaluations of source credibility will be influenced more by the 
level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than 
by source. 
 
H3c: Evaluations of author credibility will be influenced more by the 
level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than 
by source. 
 
H3d: Evaluations of content credibility will be influenced more by the 
level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than 
by source.  
 
 
 Hostile Media Effect and Online Behaviors 
Commenting Behavior    
 
             A national survey by Hernando (2007) found that the hostile media effect 
positively related to behaviors for expressing opinions in the public sphere, such as 
commenting on news. Those who perceived news as biased against their points of 
view were more likely to post comments on the news to correct the perceived bias 
(Hernando, 2007).  




influenced users’ behavioral willingness to engage in discursive activities. The 
researchers investigated ‘media indignation’, which refers to “a set of negative 
emotional reactions to media coverage perceived to have partisan bias” (p.76). The 
researchers found that hostile media effect leads to media indignation, which 
“motivates individuals to engage in discursive activities, such as expressing criticism 
of the media, voicing one’s own views, and/or discussing one’s opinions with others 
that are seen as necessary to right the wrongs and make their own views heard in the 
public sphere” (Hwang et al., 2008, p.80). 
     This study extends the previous research by measuring users’ commenting 
behavior following exposure to a mainstream news or blog posting with a valence 
either congenial with or opposite from partisans’ opinions. This investigation 
predicts: 
H4a: Partisans exposed to mainstream news opposite from their 
opinion will comment more than partisans exposed to news congenial 
with their opinion. 
 
H4b: Partisans exposed to blog posting opposite from their opinion 
will comment more than partisans exposed to blog posting congenial 
with their opinion. 
 
Information Seeking Behavior   
 
                Information seeking on the web can be explained using the concept of 
selective exposure, and a possible behavioral consequence of hostile media effect 
(Kim, 2010). Selective exposure is the tendency for individuals to select information 
supporting their own opinion (Fisher, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2004). 
Specifically, individuals generally prefer to seek information congenial with their 




                 Selective exposure to news source was found to be triggered by audiences’ 
partisanship. Lyengar & Hahn (2009) found ideological selectivity in media use, with 
conservative Republicans preferring news from a conservative news source (Fox 
News) and avoiding what they perceive to be more liberal sources (CNN or National 
Public Radio). Liberals and Democrats preferred the opposite sources. Researchers 
found selective exposure based on ideology not only in political news, but also in 
sports and travel information. These results demonstrate “the pervasiveness of the 
ideological divides in news selection” (Lyengar et al., 2009, p. 32). 
                Stroud (2007) analyzed data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election 
Survey and reported that political beliefs motivate media exposure. The researcher 
discovered that 64 percent of conservative Republicans visited a least one 
conservative media outlet compared to 26 percent of liberal Democrats. In contrast, 
76 percent of liberal Democrats visited at least one liberal media outlet compared to 
43 percent of conservative Republicans. These data also revealed partisan selective 
exposure across other media including newspapers, political talk radio, cable news, 
and the Internet.             
                 To confirm partisans' selective exposure to related content on the web after 
reading mainstream news or blog posting, this study hypothesizes: 
H5a: Partisans will be more likely to select related mainstream news 
that supports their opinion as compared to news opposite from their 
opinion. 
 
H5b: Partisans will be more likely to select related blog postings that 






                 Regarding the relationship between hostile media effect and selective 
exposure to content, Kim (2011) found that hostile media perception positively 
correlated with individuals’ selective exposure to news about global warming. 
“Partisans, who experience hostile media perception, are much more likely to seek 
out stories regarding global warming that are consistent with their views on the topic” 
(Kim, 2011, p. 695). This suggests that hostile media effect will enhance the tendency 
of selective exposure to web content.  
              Based on the previous research, this study hypothesizes that perceived 
hostile bias of mainstream news and blog postings will motivate partisans to seek 
more content consistent with their views. Although partisans do not judge congenial 
content to be hostile to their points of view, they exhibit hostile bias when they read 
disagreeable content (Gunther et al., 2001; Gunther et al., 2009). Accordingly, this 
study predicts: 
H6a: Partisans exposed to mainstream news opposite from their 
opinion are more likely to seek more information supporting their 
position than partisans reading mainstream news congenial with their 
opinions. 
 
H6b: Partisans exposed to blog posting opposite from their opinion 
are more likely to seek more information supporting their position 












Chapter 4 Method 
 
Study Design 
   To test this study’s hypotheses, a 2 (partisan opinion) x 2 (news source) x 2 
(content valence) factorial experiment was conducted (Table 3). The two levels of 
partisan opinion were either extreme support or extreme opposition to the issues of 
same sex marriage and guns on campus. The two levels of news sources included 
either a professional mainstream news site (the Associated Press) or a citizen-
produced blog. The two levels of content valence were either supporting (pro) or 
opposing (anti) content about the controversial issues  
 
Factor 1 Partisan Opinion 
Levels 1. Extreme support (pro) for 
same sex marriage or guns on 
campus 
2. Extreme opposition (anti) for same 
sex marriage or guns on campus 
 
Factor 2 News Source 
Levels 1. Mainstream news site (the 
Associated Press)  
2. User-generated blog 
 
Factor 3 Content Valence 
Levels 1. Content supporting (pro) same 
sex marriage or guns on campus 
2. Content opposing (anti) same sex 
marriage or guns on campus 
 
 
 Table 3. Study Design  
Participants 
 
   Previous studies found that an individual’s involvement with a controversial 
issue is an important predictor of hostile media effect (Gunther, 1992; Gunther et al., 




levels of opinion (pro or anti) and those with group membership related to the issue of 
same sex marriage or guns on campus. The partisanship character of group members 
was confirmed by measuring their extreme opinions on the two issues.            
            Partisans of same sex marriage were recruited from supporting or opposing 
groups.  Pro-participants were drawn from:  Marriage Equality, Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender Equity Center on University of Maryland. Anti- 
participants were recruited from:  Maryland Family Alliance, Maryland Catholic 
Conference, and the university’s Catholic Student Association. 
              Partisans of guns on campus were recruited from the two groups. Pro-guns 
participants were recruited from Students for Concealed Carry on Campus. Anti-guns 
participants were recruited from the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.  
               Leaders of these participating groups distributed the sign-up link to this 
experiment (Appendix A) to their membership using their organization’s newsletter 
or Facebook page. Only those participants who expressed an extreme opinion on 
same sex marriage or guns on campus were selected for this study.   
                Partisans were also recruited from the student population at the University 
of Maryland. An invitation was posted on the university’s ‘FYI’ Listserv, which 
shares campus information via email with faculty, staff, and students of the 
university. Students of selected journalism classes, such as JOUR 150 (open to all 
majors) and 479 (open to only journalism majors) were also invited. Similar to those 
participants with group membership, only those campus participants who expressed 





               To determine the appropriate sample size, an acceptable level of power and 
effect size should be established before starting an experiment (Hinkle, Wiersma & 
Jurs, 2003). Therefore, a power analysis was conducted to estimate the number of 
participants required to measure possible effects and power predicted. 
             This analysis referred to the effect size and desirable power estimated in 
Cohen (1962), which analyzed studies published in the 1960 volume of the Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology. Cohen reported standardized small, medium, large 
effect size for various statistical tests. Based on Cohen’s conventions, .25 for a 
medium effect size and F test was selected (Cohen, 1962). Cohen (1965) also 
provided .80 as a convention for a desirable power. Following his recommendation, 
power was set at .80. Therefore, this factorial design could obtain a power of .80 with 
a minimum combined sample size of 128 participants (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & 
Buchner, 2007). The goal was to recruit more than 128 participants for each of the 
two controversial issues tested. 
Participants for the Same Sex Marriage Issue 
 
                Of the 919 participants who completed the pre survey, 405 completed the 
post survey. Of those, participants indicating only an extreme pro or anti position 
about same sex marriage issue were selected (N = 314). The initial sample was 
unequal with 252 ‘very strongly or strongly’ supporting same sex marriage and 66 
participants ‘very strongly or strongly’ opposing same sex marriage. To produce 
equal sample sizes of 66 participants from each group (for valid statistical analyses), 
SPSS was used to randomly select 66 participants from the sample of 252 supporting 




‘anti’ participants.  
  Mean age of the 132 participants was 31.30 years (SD =13.68) with 62.1% 
female and 37.1% male (Table 4). A little more than half of the participants (53.8%) 
reported that they had either an undergraduate or graduate degree. 41.7% were 
college students. In terms of racial demographics, 67.4% indicated Caucasian, 10.6% 
Asian, 8.3% African American, and 6.8% Hispanic. 
 




Attending a college /university now 
(41.7 %) 
 
Undergraduate degree (28.0%) 
Graduate degree (25.8%)    
High school diploma (4.5%)     
 
 
Caucasian (67.4 %) 
Asian (10.6%) 





Table 4. Demographics of participants for the same sex marriage issue 
 Participants for Guns on Campus Issue  
 
                Similar to the unequal sample size for same sex marriage, 65 participants 
said they ‘very strongly or strongly’ supported guns on campus while 281 participants 
said they ‘very strongly or strongly’ opposed guns on campus. Again, SPSS software 
was used to randomly select 65 participants from the 281 gun opposing participants, 
producing a sample of 130 gun partisans, 65 ‘pro’ and 65 ‘anti’ participants.  
                 Mean age of the gun participants was 29.2 years (SD =11.82) with 45.4% 
female and 53.1% male (Table 5). The half (50%) reported that they were college 




graduate degree. 73.1% self-reported that they were Caucasian, 10% Asian, 7.7% 
African American, and 4.6 % Hispanic. 
 






Attending a college /university now  
(50 %) 
 
Undergraduate degree (23.1%) 
Graduate degree (23.1%)    
High school diploma (2.3%)     
 
 
Caucasian (73.1 %) 
Asian (10%) 





Table 5. Demographics of participants for the guns on campus issue 
Stimuli  
 
               Two texts for each controversial issue, representing two levels of content 
valence (pro or anti), were produced as either an online mainstream news story 
(Associated Press.com) or a user-generated blog posting. Four stimuli were 
manipulated, each with the identical length of 380 words.  
            All four texts were pre-tested before the experiment to check if the valence of 
each was manipulated as intended. On a survey for this pretest, eleven journalism 
students read all four texts and then evaluated the valence of each text. All 
participants ‘very strongly or strongly’ agreed with the valence of each stimulus.16
                                                 
16 They were asked "to what extent do you agree with following statement about the story you just 
read?" The statements included "the story supports same sex marriage or guns on campus." This was 
measured using a seven-point Likert scale (1=very strongly disagree, 7=very strongly agree). 
  
Results indicated that all stimuli were successfully manipulated either supporting or 




                 The identical textual content for each issue was matched with either an 
Associated Press logo on a web page with a byline and publishing date or with a 
fictitious blogger’s name and publishing date (see Appendix D).  All content was 
presented as black text on a white background. Participants exposed to the Associated 
Press news were told a professional journalist wrote the content. Those exposed to 
the blog posting were told that the content was written by a citizen who was not a 
professional journalist.    
               All of texts were followed by the option for user comments. For ecological 
validity, participants were free to post their comments similar to actual online news 
sites and blogs.  
Instrument 
 
      Participants’ opinions on same sex marriage and guns on campus were 
assessed in a pre-survey with the single item asking the extent to which the 
participant supports same sex marriage and guns on campus (Appendix C). Opinions 
were measured using a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 
(very strongly agree) and 4 as a neutral midpoint. In addition to opinions, participants 
were asked about their familiarity, relevance, prior knowledge, following of media 
coverage, and feeling toward the issues.  
                To reduce any priming effects, the pre-testing of opinions for same sex 
marriage and guns on campus was embedded with five other controversial issues 
including opinions about the death penalty, abortion, medical testing using animals, 




one week before exposing each participant to the experimental stimuli to reduce their 
memory of the intended target topics. 
      The post-survey (Appendix E) assessed participants’ perceived bias of 
content using three questions adapted from previous studies (Giner-Sorolla et al., 
1994; Gunther et al., 2004; Gunther et al., 2006; Gunther et al., 2009). On a seven-
point Likert scale, participants indicated whether they believed ‘the content read is 
biased’, ‘the source of the content is biased’, and ‘the author of the content is biased.’  
The three items were combined to create a ‘bias’ index with high reliability (α=.82 for 
same sex marriage, α=.84 for guns on campus).  
                 Participants rated the believability and trustworthiness of the source (the 
Associated Press or a blog). Two items were combined as an index of ‘source 
credibility’ (α=.90 for same sex marriage, α=.91 for guns on campus).  
                Participants were also asked about the author’s believability, 
trustworthiness and knowledge about the issue. These three items formed an ‘author 
credibility’ index (α=.89 for same sex marriage, α=.89 for guns on campus).     
      Content credibility on the post-survey was measured using items from prior 
credibility studies by Flanagin & Metzger (2000) and Park (2005). Participants were 
asked about their perceived trustworthiness, believability, accuracy and depth of the 
information read plus their willingness to recommend the content to others. These 
items combined to form an index of ‘content credibility’ and provided high reliability 




                The behavior of user commenting was measured by examining whether 
participants made comments. Participants were instructed, “Post an optional comment 
if you would like.”  
                 Participants’ information seeking behavior was measured based on the 
previous studies by Arpan & Nabi (2011) and Kim (2010), which exposed 
participants to a list of eight news stories or blog postings. The list in this study was 
composed of headlines of news stories or blog postings. The headlines were 
manipulated for disclosing the content’s valence (supporting or opposing the issues 
tested). Four news stories or blog postings supported same sex marriage or guns on 
campus. Another four news stories or blog postings opposed same sex marriage or 
guns on campus. Participants were asked to indicate their willingness to read the news 
story or blog posting using a scale from 1 (not likely) to 7 (very likely).    
               As a manipulation check, all participants indicated whether they perceived 
the online news story or blog posting as supporting same sex marriage or guns on 
campus. Finally, participants indicated their age, gender, education, and race. 
 
Procedure  
       First, participants volunteering to complete this online experiment received 
an email from the researcher, which contained a Survey Monkey URL to an informed 
consent form (Appendix B) approved by Institutional Review Board of University of 
Maryland. The form was followed by the pre survey. After completing the pre survey, 
participants were told that they would receive a URL to the experimental site via 




      For the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions displayed on Survey Monkey.com. Each condition included content 
related to the two target issues (same sex marriage and guns on campus). Actual 
stimuli included the Associated Press story that either supported or opposed same sex 
marriage or guns on campus and a blog posting with either supporting or opposing the 
issues. After reading the assigned content, participants were asked to click a link to 
the post survey. Participants were prohibited from clicking back to previously read 





Chapter 5 Results 
 
 
This experimental study tested hypotheses related to partisan audiences’ 
perceived bias, credibility, and online behaviors using two controversial issues, same 
sex marriage and guns on campus.   
Summary of Findings 
               The results from the two issues are summarized Table 6a through 6e. Table 
6a shows results about the relative hostile media effect of mainstream news on 
partisans’ perceived bias, and source, author and content credibility. Table 6b shows 
results on the relative hostile media effect in blog posting. Table 6c reveals how 
partisans’ opinion and source influence evaluations of identical content from different 
sources. Table 6d summarizes results on partisans’ commenting behavior. Table 6e 
provides the results on partisans’ further information seeking behavior.     
 




H1a Relative hostile media effect on perceived bias YES YES 
H1b Relative hostile media effect on perceived source 
credibility 
NO YES 
H1c Relative hostile media effect on perceived author 
credibility 
YES YES 




Table 6a. Summary of results on relative hostile media effect 
in mainstream news 















H2a Relative hostile media effect on perceived bias   YES YES 
H2b Relative hostile media effect on perceived source 
credibility  
YES YES 
H2c Relative hostile media effect on perceived author 
credibility  
YES YES 




Table 6b. Summary of results on relative hostile media effect in blog posting 
 




H3a Evaluations of bias will be influenced more by 
the level of agreement between partisan opinion 
and content valence than by source 
YES YES 
H3b Evaluations of source credibility will be 
influenced more by the level of agreement 
between partisan opinion and content valence 
than by source 
NO NO 
H3c Evaluations of author credibility will be 
influenced more by the level of agreement 
between partisan opinion and content valence 
than by source 
YES NO 
H3d Evaluations of content credibility will be 
influenced more by the level of agreement 
between partisan opinion and content valence 
than by source 
YES YES 
 
Table 6c. Summary of results on evaluations of identical content from  
















H4a Hostile media effect will influence commenting 
on mainstream news 
YES YES 
H4b Hostile media effect will influence commenting 
on blog posting  
YES YES 
 
Table 6d. Summary of results on commenting behavior 
 




H5a Selective exposure to related mainstream news  YES YES 
H5b Selective exposure to related blog postings  YES YES 
H6a Hostile media effect will influence selective 
exposure to related mainstream news  
NO NO 
H6b Hostile media effect will influence selective 




Table 6e. Summary of results on further information seeking behavior 
The results of the same sex marriage issue will be presented first followed by 
the results of the guns on campus issue.  
The Same Sex Marriage Issue 
 
Manipulation Check  
 
   A general linear model univariate analysis of variance was employed using 
perceived valence of content as a dependent variable and manipulated content valence 
and participants’ opinion as independent variables. There was a significant main 
effect of manipulated content valences on participants’ perceived content valence (F 
(1,123) = 199.91, p < .001, 𝜂2= .62). There was no significant main effect of 




manipulated content valences and participants’ opinions (F (1,123) = .00, p > .05). 
Regardless of participants’ opinion, those who read content manipulated for 
supporting same sex marriage agreed that ‘the content supports same sex marriage’ 
(M=5.91, SD=.22). Conversely, those who read content manipulated for opposing 
same sex marriage disagreed with the same statement (M=1.71, SD=.20) (See Figure 
7). There was no significant difference between supporters and opponents of same 
sex marriage in terms of the perceived content valence. Significant differences in 
participants’ perceptions depended on the manipulated valence of pro or anti same 
sex marriage This suggests that participants’ opinions did not influence perceived 
content valence. Participants perceived content valence as manipulated. Therefore, we 
can conclude stimuli about same sex marriage were successfully manipulated.   
 
 
Figure 7. Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived content valence of stimuli as a  
function of manipulated content valence and partisan group 







Relative Hostile Media Effect in Mainstream News 
 
                 H1a: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive 
the news as more biased than partisans with opinions congenial with the news. 
 
One-way ANOVA produced a significant main effect of level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence on perceived bias (F (1, 63) = 12.05, p < .001,  
𝜂2 = .16). Specifically, partisans with opinions that differed from mainstream news 
(M = 5.44, SD = .20) perceived that news as more biased than partisans with 
congenial opinions with the news (M = 4.28, SD = .27).  Figure 8a shows that while 
pro-same sex marriage partisans evaluated anti-news to be more biased than anti-
partisans, anti-partisans perceived pro-news to be more biased than pro-partisans. H1a 
was supported.   
 
 
Figure 8a.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived bias of mainstream 
news as a function of content valence and partisan group 
  
               
                 H1b: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will 
perceive a mainstream source as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial 





There was no statistically significant difference (F (1, 65) = .04, p >.05) in perceived 
source credibility between partisans with opinions different from the news (M = 4.42, 
SD = .23) and partisans with congenial opinions with the news (M = 4.50, SD = .31). 
Figure 8b shows that regardless of valence of content read, both supporters and 
opponents of same sex marriage evaluated source credibility of AP news similarly. 
H1b was not supported.    
 
Figure 8b.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived source credibility of 
mainstream news as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
 
               H1c: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive 




In support of H1c, one-way ANOVA confirmed a statistically significant difference 
(F (1, 64) = 21.94, p < .001. 𝜂2 = .26) suggesting that partisans with opinions 
different from news (M = 3.27, SD = .22) perceived the author of the news, a 
professional journalist, as less credible than partisans with congenial opinions (M = 




anti-content to be less credible than anti-partisans, anti-partisans perceived the author 
of pro-content to be less credible than pro-partisans.   
 
Figure 8c.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived author credibility of 
mainstream news as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
 
   H1d: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive 
the content of the news as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial with 
the news.   
 
One-way ANOVA confirmed a statistically significant main effect of level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence on perceived content 
credibility (F (1, 62) = 31.48, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .34). Partisans with opinions opposite 
from content’s valence (M = 2.54, S = .22) rated that content as less credible 
compared to partisans with opinions congenial with the content’s valence (M = 4.54, 
SD = .28). Figure 8d shows that while supporters of same sex marriage evaluated 
anti-same sex marriage content to be less credible than opponents, opponents 
perceived pro-same sex marriage content as less credible than supporters. H1d was 






Figure 8d.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived content credibility of 
mainstream news as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
             There were significant differences between supporters and opponents of same 
sex marriage in their perceptions of mainstream news online in terms of bias, author 
credibility, and content credibility. However, there was no significant difference 
between both partisans in perceptions of the mainstream news in terms of source 
credibility.             
    
Relative Hostile Media Effect in Blog Posting   
    H2a: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
posting as more biased than partisans with opinions congenial with the posting. 
 
One-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence on perceived bias (F (1, 54) = 11.08, p < .01, 𝜂2 
= .17). Partisans with opposite opinions from blog posting (M = 5.74, SD = .25) rated 




posting (M = 4.53, SD = .27).  Figure 9a shows that while pro-partisans evaluated 
anti-same sex marriage posting as more biased than anti-partisans, anti-partisans 
perceived pro-same sex marriage posting as more biased than pro-partisans. H2a was 
supported.   
 
 
Figure 9a.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived bias of blog posting as 
a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
  H2b: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
blog as a less credible source than partisans with opinions congenial with the 
posting.    
 
Partisans with opposite opinions from a blog posting (M = 2.70, SD = .22) rated the 
blog as a less credible source than those with opinions congenial with the posting (M 
= 4.14, SD = .24). This difference was statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 19.58, p < 
.001, 𝜂2 = .27). Figure 9b shows that proponents evaluated a blog presenting anti-
same sex marriage posting as a less credible source than opponents. It also shows that 
opponents rated a blog with pro-same sex marriage posting as a less credible source 






Figure 9b.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived source credibility of 
blog posting as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
 
  H2c: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
author of the posting as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial with the 
posting.    
 
One-way ANOVA confirmed a statistically significant difference (F (1, 53) = 26.16, 
p < .001. 𝜂2 = .27) with opposing partisans from a blog posting (M = 3.26, SD = .21) 
rating the posting’s author, a citizen blogger, as less credible than congenial partisans 
with the posting (M = 4.85, SD = .23). Figure 9c indicates that supporters perceived 
the author of an anti-posting as less credible than opponents. The figure also shows 






Figure 9c.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived author credibility of 
blog posting as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
 
   H2d: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
content of the blog posting as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial 
with the posting. 
 
In support of H2d, there was a significant main effect of level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence on perceived content credibility (F (1, 53) = 
34.38, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .39). Partisans with opinions opposite from a blog posting (M = 
2.55, SD = .24) rated the content of the posting as less credible than partisans with 
opinion congenial with the posting (M = 4.57, SD = .24). While supporters of the 
issue evaluated the anti-content of the posting as less credible than opponents, 









Figure 9d.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived content credibility of blog 
posting as a function of content valence and partisan group  
 
               
          In sum, there were significant differences in perceived bias, source credibility, 
author credibility, and content credibility of blog posting between supporters and 
opponents of the same sex marriage issue.  
News Source versus Partisan Opinion  
 
                H3a:  Evaluations of bias will be influenced more by the level of agreement 
between partisan opinion and content valence than by source. 
 
Results of a two-way ANOVA produced a significant main effect of level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence on perceived bias (F (1,117) 
=30.03, p < .001. 𝜂2 = .20), but the effect of the source was not significant (F (1,117) 
= .63, p > .05). There was also no significant interaction between source, and level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence (F (1,117) = .021, p > .05). 
Whereas the level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence 
significantly influenced perceived bias, the source did not. Although there was no 




content, there was a significant difference between partisan groups with opinions that 
agree and disagree with content’s valence (Figure 10a). Hypothesis 3a was supported. 
 
 
Figure 10a. Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived bias as a function of source 
and the level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence  
(NOTE. Group 1 is partisans who agree with content valence.  
Group 2 is partisans who disagree with content valence) 
 
                 H3b:  Evaluations of source credibility will be influenced more by the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than by source. 
 
There was a significant main effect of level of agreement between partisan opinion 
and content valence on source credibility (F (1,119) =6.76, p < .05. 𝜂2 = .05). The 
main effect of source was also significant (F (1,119) =18.11, p < .001. 𝜂2 = .13) and 
there was a significant interaction between source, and level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence (F (1,119) =7.54, p < .05, 𝜂2 = .06). Both 
factors produced effects that depended on each other. Figure 10b shows that both 
supporters and opponents evaluated the mainstream source (M = 4.54, SD = .18) as 




with the content valence, there was no significant difference (F (1, 48) =.91, p >.05) 
in evaluations of the mainstream source (M = 4.52, SD = .28) and blog (M = 4.14, SD 
= .27). Conversely, partisans with different opinions from content valence evaluated 
the mainstream source (M = 4.56, SD = .21) as more credible than the blog (M = 2.77, 
SD = .25). This difference was significant (F (1, 71) =26.63, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .27). 
Therefore, we cannot say that the level of agreement between partisan opinion and 
content valence more than source will influence evaluations of source credibility. H3b 





Figure 10b. Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived source credibility  
as a function of source and the level of agreement between partisan  
opinion and content valence  
(NOTE. Group 1 is partisans who agree with content valence.  








                 H3c: Evaluations of author credibility will be influenced more by the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than by source. 
 
There was a significant main effect of level of agreement between partisan opinion 
with content valence on author credibility (F (1,117) =58.61, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .33) but 
the effect of source was not significant (F (1,117) = .04, p > .05). There was also no 
significant interaction between source, and level of agreement between partisan 
opinion and content valence (F (1,117) = 1.02, p > .05). Figure 10c shows that all 
partisans rated the credibility of journalists and bloggers in a similar way. However, it 
also indicates that the evaluations of an author depended on the partisans’ opinions 
and content valence. Partisans evaluated author credibility based on whether their 





Figure 10c.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived author credibility  
as a function of source and the level of agreement between partisan  
opinion and content valence  
(NOTE. Group 1 is partisans who agree with content valence.  





                 H3d: Evaluations of content credibility will be influenced more by the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than by source.  
 
There was a significant main effect of level of agreement between partisan opinion 
with content valence on content credibility (F (1,115) =82.64, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .42) but 
the effect of source was not significant (F (1,115) = .02, p > .05). There was also no 
significant interaction between source, and level of agreement between partisan 
opinion and content valence (F (1,115) = .47, p > .05). Figure 10d shows that all 
partisans similarly perceived credibility of identical content from mainstream media 
and a blog. However, partisans evaluated identical content differently depending on 
their opinions and content valence. Whether the content came from mainstream media 
or a blog did not appear to influence evaluation of content credibility. Only whether 
content valence was congenial with partisans’ opinion appeared to be a significant 
factor in evaluations of content credibility. H3d was supported. 
 
Figure 10d.  Same sex marriage partisans’ perceived content credibility  
as a function of source and the level of agreement between partisan  
opinion and content valence  
(NOTE. Group 1 is partisans who agree with content valence.  





                 To summarize, the level of agreement between partisan opinion and 
content valence - rather than source - produced significant differences in perceived 
bias, author credibility, and content credibility of content from both mainstream 
source and blog. However, the source (mainstream or blog) played an important role 
in producing a significant difference in perceived source credibility of the content.    
Partisans’ Commenting Behavior 
 
              H4a: Partisans exposed to mainstream news opposite from their opinion will 
comment more than partisans exposed to news congenial with their opinion. 
 
A Chi-square test was conducted to examine the association between the level of 
agreement between partisan opinion with content valence, and their commenting 
behavior. The level of agreement between partisan opinion with content valence were 
coded as two categorical variables, partisan opinions congenial with and different 
from content valence. Commenting behavior was coded as two categorical variables 
of ‘comment’ or ‘no comment.’ Results indicated that there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the level of agreement between partisan opinion and 
content valence, and their commenting behavior in mainstream news (𝜒2=5.68, df =1, 
p < .05).  To test for statistically significance differences, residual analysis was 
conducted. As illustrated in Table 7, adjusted residuals17 for each cell were either 2.4 
or -2.4, which had an absolute value greater than critical value.18
                                                 
17 “ Adjusted residual has been standardized and can be interpreted like a Z score. These adjusted 
residuals can be used to determine whether the difference between observed and expected frequencies 
for any given group is significant” (Aspelmeier & Pierce,2009, p.200) 
 Thus, all cells were 
statistically significant. Given the pattern of positive and negative residuals, there 
were more partisans who disagreed with content valence and fewer partisans who 




agreed with the content valence than we expected in those who commented. Figure 
11a also shows that partisans reading mainstream news different from their opinion 
commented more than partisans reading news congenial with their opinion. 
Therefore, H4a was supported. 
 
 COMMENT Total 







Count 21 5 26 
Expected Count 16.3 9.7 26.0 
% within COMMENT 47.7% 19.2% 37.1% 
Adjusted Residual19 2.4  -2.4  
Disagree 
(different) 
Count 23 21 44 
Expected Count 27.7 16.3 44.0 
% within COMMENT 52.3% 80.8% 62.9% 
Adjusted Residual -2.4 2.4  
Total 
Count 44 26 70 
Expected Count 44.0 26.0 70.0 
% within COMMENT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
Table 7.  The level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence x 
Comment Cross-Tabulation after same sex marriage partisans  
read mainstream news 
 
 
                                                 
19 “If the crosstab table is a 2x2 table, then all of the adjusted residuals will have the same absolute 
value, but exactly 2 of them will be negative.”  





Figure11a. Amount of comment as a function of the level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence of mainstream news  




              H4b: Partisans exposed to blog posting opposite from their opinion will 
comment more than partisans exposed to posting congenial with their opinion. 
 
Results of a Chi-square test indicated that there was a significant relationship between 
level of agreement between partisan opinion with content valence, and their 
commenting behavior on a blog (𝜒2=5.34, df =1, p < .05).  Table 8 shows that 
adjusted residuals20 for each cell were either 2.3 or -2.3, which produced an absolute 
value greater than critical value.21
                                                 
20 “Adjusted residuals has been standardized and can be interpreted like a Z score. These adjusted 
residuals can be used to determine whether the difference between observed and expected frequencies 
for any given group is  significant” (Aspelmeier & Pierce ,2009, p.200) 
 Thus, all cells were statistically significant. Given 
the pattern of positive and negative residuals, there were more partisans who 
disagreed with content valence and fewer partisans who agreed with the content 
valence than we expected in those who commented. Figure 11b shows that those who 
read blog posting with a valence different from their opinion commented more than 
partisans reading posting supporting their opinions. H4b was supported. 






 COMMENT Total 
NO COMMENT COMMENT 





Count 25 5 30 
Expected Count 20.8 9.2 30.0 
% within COMMENT 58.1% 26.3% 48.4% 
Adjusted Residual22 2.3  -2.3  
Disagree 
(different) 
Count 18 14 32 
Expected Count 22.2 9.8 32.0 
% within COMMENT 41.9% 73.7% 51.6% 
Adjusted Residual -2.3 2.3  
Total 
Count 43 19 62 
Expected Count 43.0 19.0 62.0 
% within COMMENT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 Table 8. The level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence x 




Figure 11b. Amount of comment as a function of the level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence of blog posting  
in the issue of same sex marriage 
 
               
                                                 
22 “If the crosstab table is a 2x2 table, then all of the adjusted residuals will have the same absolute 
value, but exactly 2 of them will be negative. ” 




Partisans’ Information Seeking Behavior  
 
Selective Exposure to Related Content 
 
             H5a: Partisans will be more likely to select related mainstream news that 
supports their opinion as compared to news opposite from their opinion. 
 
Mixed analyses of between and within subjects ANOVA were conducted to test H5a. 
Between-subjects factor was partisan opinion either supporting or opposing the issue 
and within-subject factor was related news either supporting or opposing the issue. 
There was no significant main effect of partisan opinion on their willingness to read 
related news (F (1, 62) = .28, p > .05). There was also no significant main effect of 
related news’s valence (F (1, 62) = .53, p > .05). However, interaction between 
partisans’ opinion and valence of related news was significant (F (1, 62) = 15.07, p < 
.001, 𝜂2 = .38). Pro-partisans rated ‘willingness to read pro-related news’ higher (M = 
4.95, SD = .29) than anti-related news (M = 3.36, SD = .30). This difference was 
statistically significant (F (1, 33) = 15.07, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .31). Anti-partisans were 
also more willing to read anti-related news (M = 5.00, SD = .31) than pro-related 
news (M = 2.98, SD = .31) and the difference was also significant (F (1, 29) = 22.90, 







Figure 12a.  Same sex marriage partisans’ willingness to read related 
mainstream news as a function of partisan group and valence of related news 
 
               H5b: Partisans will be more likely to select related blog postings that 
support their opinion as compared to blog postings opposite from their opinion. 
 
Mixed analyses of between and within subjects ANOVA showed no significant main 
effect of partisan opinion (F (1, 52) = .02, p > .05) and valence of related blog 
posting (F (1, 52) = .02, p > .05) on their willingness to read further information. 
However, there was a significant interaction between partisan opinion and valence of 
related blog postings (F (1, 52) = 27.02, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .34). Pro-partisans rated the 
willingness to read pro-related blog postings (M = 4.74, SD = .30) higher than anti-
related blog postings (M = 3.27, SD = .35). This difference was statistically 
significant (F (1, 24) = 11.13, p < .01, 𝜂2= .32). Anti-partisans showed higher 
willingness to read anti-related blog postings (M = 5.00, SD = .32) than pro-related 
blog postings (M = 3.10, SD = .28). The difference was also significant (F (1, 28) = 





Figure 12b. Same sex marriage partisans’ willingness to read related blog 




Hostile media effect and selective exposure 
 
                 H6a: Partisans exposed to mainstream news opposite from their opinion 
are more likely to seek more information supporting their position than partisans 
reading mainstream news congenial with their opinions. 
 
 In the measure of willingness to read pro-related news, there was no significant 
difference (F (1, 32) =.01, p > .05) between supporters reading pro-news (M = 4.91, 
SD = .51) and anti-news (M = 4.97, SD = .35). Opponents reading pro-news (M = 
4.90, SD = .41) and anti-news (M = 5.15, SD = .50) also reported almost the same 
level of willingness to read anti-related news (F (1, 28) =. 17, p > .05).  H6a was not 
supported.   
               H6b: Partisans exposed to blog posting opposite from their opinion are 
more likely to seek more information supporting their position than partisans reading 
blog posting congenial with their opinions. 
 
In terms of their willingness to read pro-related postings, there was no significant 
difference (F (1, 23) = 2.74, p >.05) between supporters reading a pro-blog posting 




pro-blog posting (M = 5.23, SD = .52) and anti-blog posting (M = 4.79, SD = .50) 
self-reported almost the same level of willingness to read anti-blog posting (F (1, 27) 
= .38, p>.05). Consequently, H6b was not supported.     
The Guns on Campus Issue 
 
Manipulation Check  
 
   A general linear model univariate analysis of variance was employed using 
perceived valence of content as a dependent variable and manipulated content valence 
and participants’ opinion as independent variables. There was a significant main 
effect of manipulated content valences on participants’ perceive content valence (F 
(1,115) = 490.14, p < .001. 𝜂2 = .81). There was also a significant main effect of 
participants’ opinion (F (1,115) = 5.86, p< .05, 𝜂2 = .05) but no significant 
interaction of manipulated content valence and participants’ opinion (F (1,115) = 
1.75, p > .05). When reading manipulated content supporting guns, there was no 
significant difference between pro and anti gun partisans in perceived valence of the 
content (F (1,57) = .61, p >.05). When reading manipulated content opposing guns, 
the difference was significant (F (1, 58) = 7.05, p < .05, 𝜂2 = .11). However, whereas 
manipulated content valence accounted for 81% of the variance in perceived content 
valence, participants’ opinion explained just 5% of the variance. Those who read 
content manipulated for supporting guns on campus, agreed that ‘the content supports 
guns on campus’ (M=6.42, SD= .15). Conversely, those who read content 
manipulated for opposing guns on campus disagreed with the same statement 




short, participants perceived content valence as manipulated. Therefore, we can claim 
that the stimuli about guns on campus used in this experiment were successfully 
manipulated.   
 
 
Figure 13. Gun partisans’ perceived content valence of stimuli as a   
function of manipulated content valence and partisan group  
 
 
Relative Hostile Media Effect in Mainstream news 
 
  H1a: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive 
the news as more biased than partisans with opinions congenial with the news. 
 
One-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence on perceived bias (F (1, 58) = 11.63, p < .01, 𝜂2 
= .17). Partisans with opinions that differed from mainstream news  (M = 5.53, SD = 
.25) perceived that news as more biased than congenial partisans with the news (M = 
4.43, SD = .20) Figure 14a shows that while pro-gun partisans evaluated anti-gun 
news to be more biased than anti-gun partisans, anti-gun partisans perceived pro-gun 






Figure 14a.  Gun partisans’ perceived bias of mainstream news as a 
function of content valence and partisan group 
 
   
   H1b: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive a 
mainstream source as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial with the 
news. 
 
There was a statistically significant difference (F (1, 58) = 7.29, p < .01, 𝜂2 = .11) in 
perceived source credibility between partisans who agree and disagree with content 
valence. Those with opinions different from content valence (M = 3.75, SD = .30) 
evaluated mainstream source as less credible than congenial partisans with content 
valence (M = 4.81, SD = .25). Figure 14b shows that while pro-gun partisans who 
read pro-gun news evaluated mainstream source as more credible than anti-gun 
partisans reading the same news, anti partisans reading anti-gun news rated the source 






Figure 14b. Gun partisans’ perceived source credibility of mainstream 




  H1c: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive 
the author of the news as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial with 
the news. 
 
In support of H1c, one-way ANOVA confirmed a statistically significant difference 
(F (1, 58) = 32.22, p < .001. 𝜂2 = .36) suggesting that partisans with opinions 
different from the news (M = 3.29, SD = .23) perceived the author of the news, a 
professional journalist, as less credible than partisans with opinions same as the news 
(M = 4.99, SD = .19). As illustrated in Figure 14c, although pro-gun partisans 
evaluated the author of anti-content to be less credible than anti-gun partisans, anti-
gun partisans perceived the author of pro-content to be less credible than pro-gun 





Figure 14c. Gun partisans’ perceived author credibility of mainstream 
news as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
 
   H1d: Partisans with opinions opposite from mainstream news will perceive 
the content of the news as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial with 
the news.   
 
One way ANOVA confirmed a statistically significant main effect of level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence on perceived content 
credibility (F (1, 58) = 79.56, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .59). Partisans with opposite opinions 
from content valence (M = 2.38, S = .21) rated that content as less credible compared 
to partisans with opinions congenial with the content valence (M = 4.81, SD = .17). 
Figure 14d shows that while supporters of guns on campus evaluated anti-gun content 
to be less credible than opponents, opponents perceived pro-gun content as less 






Figure 14d.  Gun partisans’ perceived content credibility of mainstream 
news as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
             To summarize, there were significant differences in perceived bias, source 
credibility, author credibility, and content credibility of mainstream news between 
supporters and opponents of the guns on campus issue. 
  
Relative Hostile Media Effect in Blog Posting 
 
   H2a: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
posting as more biased than partisans with opinions congenial with the posting. 
 
 One-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence on perceived bias (F (1, 56) = 17.51, p < .001, 
𝜂2= .24). Partisans with opposite opinions from blog posting (M = 6.04, SD = .24) 
rated that posting as more biased than partisans with opinions same as the posting (M 
= 4.55, SD = .27). Figure 15a shows that pro-gun partisans rated anti-gun posting as 
more biased than anti-partisans, and anti-gun partisans perceived pro-gun posting to 






Figure 15a. Gun partisans’ perceived bias of blog posting as a function of 
content valence and partisan group 
 
 
   H2b: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
blog as a less credible source than partisans with opinions congenial with the 
posting.    
 
Partisans with opposite opinions from blog posting (M = 2.66, SD = .26) rated the 
blog as a less credible source than partisans with opinions congenial with the posting 
(M = 3.85, SD = .28). This difference was statistically significant (F (1, 57) = 9.65, p 
< .01, 𝜂2 = .15). Figure 15b shows that gun proponents evaluated the blog presenting 
anti-gun posting as a less credible source than gun opponents. It also shows that 
opponents rated the blog with pro-gun posting as a less credible source than 






Figure 15b.  Gun partisans’ perceived source credibility of blog posting 
as a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
  H2c: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
author of the posting as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial with the 
posting.    
 
One-way ANOVA confirmed a statistically significant difference (F (1, 56) = 14.94, 
p < .001, 𝜂2 = .21) with opposing partisans from blog posting (M = 2.82, SD = .25) 
rating the posting’s author, a citizen blogger, as less credible than congenial partisans 
with the posting (M = 4.27, SD = .28). Figure 15c indicates that pro-gun supporters 
perceived the author of anti-gun posting as less credible than opponents. Opponents 







Figure 15c. Gun partisans’ perceived author credibility of blog posting as 
a function of content valence and partisan group 
 
 
   H2d: Partisans with opinions opposite from blog posting will perceive the 
content of the blog posting as less credible than partisans with opinions congenial 
with the posting. 
 
 In support of H2d, there was a significant main effect of level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence on perceived content credibility (F (1, 56) = 
34.32, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .38). Opposing partisans from content valence (M = 2.33, SD = 
.23) rated blog content as less credible than partisans with congenial opinions with 
content valence (M = 4.27, SD = .24). As shown in Figure 15d, although gun 
supporters evaluated anti-gun blog content to be less credible than opponents, 










Figure 15d. Gun partisans’ perceived content credibility of blog posting as a 
function of content valence and partisan group 
 
               
          In sum, there were significant differences in the evaluations of blog posting in 
terms of bias, source credibility, author credibility, and content credibility between 
supporters and opponents of the guns on campus issue.    
News Source versus Partisan Opinion  
 
                H3a:  Evaluations of bias will be influenced more by the level of agreement 
between partisan opinion and content valence than by source. 
 
 Results of a two-way ANOVA produced a significant main effect of level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence on perceived bias (F (1,114) 
=29.10, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .20), but the effect of source was not significant (F (1,114) 
=1.77, p> .05). Also, there was no significant interaction between source, and the 
level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence (F (1,114) =.65, p> 
.05). Whereas the level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence 




16a, there was no significant difference between mainstream and blog content in 
partisans’ perceptions of bias, but a significant difference between partisans who 
agree and disagree with content valence.  H3a, therefore, was supported. 
 
 
Figure 16a. Gun partisans’ perceived bias as a function of source and the level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence  
(NOTE: Group 1 is partisans who agree with the content valence  
and group 2 is partisans who disagree with the content valence) 
 
 
               H3b:  Evaluations of source credibility will be influenced more by the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than by source. 
 
There was a significant main effect of level of agreement between partisan opinion 
and content valence on source credibility (F (1,115) =16.84, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .13). The 
main effect of source was also significant (F (1,115) =13.93, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .11) but 
the interaction between source, and level of agreement between partisan opinion and 
content valence was not significant (F (1,115) =. 07, p >.05).  Source and the level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence independently influenced 
participants’ evaluations of source credibility. Even though all partisans read identical 




credible than the blog source (M = 3.25, SD = .19) (Figure 16b). Partisans with 
opinions congenial with content valence rated the source of that content as more 
credible (M = 4.30, SD = .19) than partisans with opinions different from content 
valence (M = 3.20, SD = .20). Therefore, we cannot say that the level of agreement 
between partisan opinion and content valence more than source will influence 




Figure 16b.  Gun partisans’ perceived source credibility as a function of source 
and the level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence  
(NOTE: Group1 is partisans who agree with the content valence  




                 H3c: Evaluations of author credibility will be influenced more by the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence than by source. 
 
There was a significant main effect of level of agreement between partisan opinion 
with content valence on author credibility (F (1,114) =43.28, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .28) and 
source (F (1,114) =4.14, p < .05, 𝜂2 = .28). There was no significant interaction 
between source, and level of agreement between partisan opinion with content 




partisan opinion with content valence independently influenced evaluations of author 
credibility. Even though all partisans read identical content, they evaluated the author 
of mainstream news (M = 4.14, SD = .17) as more credible than the author of blog 
posting (M = 3.55, SD = .17) (Figure 16c). Partisans with opinions congenial with 
content rated the author of the content as more credible (M = 4.63, SD = .17) than 
those with opinions different from the content (M = 3.06, SD = .17). Since we cannot 
say that that the level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence 
more than source will influence evaluations of author credibility, H3c was not 
supported.   
 
 
Figure 16c. Gun partisans’ perceived author credibility as a function of source 
and the level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence  
(NOTE:  Group1 is partisans who agree with the content valence  
And group 2 is partisans who disagree with the content valence.) 
 
 
                 H3d: Evaluations of content credibility will be influenced more by the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content's valence than by source.  
 
  There was a significant main effect of level of agreement between partisan 




.48) but the effect of source was not significant (F (1,114) =1.80, p > .05). There was 
also no significant interaction between source, and level of agreement between 
partisan opinion with content valence on content credibility (F (1,114) = 1.38, p > 
.05). Figure 16d shows that all partisans similarly perceived the credibility of 
identical content from a mainstream source and a blog. However, all partisans 
evaluated identical content differently depending on their opinions. Whether the 
content came from mainstream media or a blog did not appear to influence evaluation 
of content credibility. Only whether content valence was congenial with partisans’ 




Figure 16d. Gun partisans’ perceived content credibility as a function of source 
and level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence 
(NOTE:  Group 1 is partisans who agree with the content valence 
and group 2 is partisans who disagree with the content valence.) 
  
 
                      To summarize, the level of agreement between partisan opinion with 




bias and credibility of content from both mainstream source and blog. However, 
source (mainstream or blog) played an important role in producing a significant 
difference in perceived source and author credibility of the content.    
Partisans’ Commenting Behavior 
 
                  H4a: Partisans exposed to mainstream news opposite from their opinion 
will comment more than partisans exposed to news congenial with their opinion. 
 
 A Chi-square test was conducted to examine the association between the level of 
agreement between partisan opinion with content valence, and their commenting 
behavior. Results indicated that there was a statistically significant relationship 
between the level of agreement between partisan opinion with content valence, and 
their commenting behavior on mainstream news (𝜒2=6.78, df =1, p < .05).  As 
illustrated in Table 9, adjusted residuals23 for each cell were either 2.6 or -2.6, which 
had an absolute value greater than the critical value24
 
. Thus, all cells were statistically 
significant. Given the pattern of positive and negative residuals, there were more 
partisans who disagree with content valence and fewer partisans who agree with 
content valence than we expected in those who commented. Figure 17a shows that 
partisans reading mainstream news different from their opinion commented more than 





                                                 
23“Adjusted residual has been standardized and can be interpreted like a Z score. These adjusted 
residuals can be used to determine whether the difference between observed and expected frequencies 
for any given group is  significant” (Aspelmeier & Pierce,2009, p.200) 




 COMMENT Total 
NO COMMENT COMMENT 






Count 29 11 40 
Expected Count 24.0 16.0 40.0 
% within COMMENT 74.4% 42.3% 61.5% 
Adjusted Residual25 2.6  -2.6  
Disagree 
(different) 
Count 10 15 25 
Expected Count 15.0 10.0 25.0 
% within COMMENT 25.6% 57.7% 38.5% 
Adjusted Residual -2.6 2.6  
Total 
Count 39 26 65 
Expected Count 39.0 26.0 65.0 
% within COMMENT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 Table 9.  The level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence x 





Figure17a. Amount of comments as a function of the level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence of mainstream news  
in the issue of guns on campus    
    
             H4b: Partisans exposed to blog posting opposite from their opinion will 
comment more than partisans exposed to posting congenial with their opinion. 
 
                                                 
25 “If the crosstab table is a 2x2 table, then all of the adjusted residuals will have the same absolute 
value, but exactly 2 of them will be negative.”   




Results of a Chi square test indicated a statistically significant relationship between 
the level of agreement between partisan opinion with content valence, and their 
commenting behavior on blog posting (𝜒2=6.52, df =1, p < .05). Table 10 shows that 
adjusted residuals26 for each cell were either 2.4 or -2.4, which had an absolute value 
greater than the critical value.27
 
 Thus, all cells were statistically significant. Given the 
pattern of positive and negative residuals, there were more partisans who disagree 
with content valence and fewer partisans who agree with content valence than we 
expected in those who commented. Figure 17b shows that those who read blog 
posting with a valence different from their opinion commented more than partisans 
reading blog posting supporting their opinions. H4b was supported.  
 COMMENT Total 
NO COMMENT COMMENT 






Count 23 5 28 
Expected Count 18.5 9.5 28.0 
% within COMMENT 53.5% 22.7% 43.1% 
Adjusted Residual28 2.4  -2.4  
Disagree 
(different) 
Count 20 17 37 
Expected Count 24.5 12.5 37.0 
% within COMMENT 46.5% 77.3% 56.9% 
Adjusted Residual -2.4 2.4  
Total 
Count 43 22 65 
Expected Count 43.0 22.0 65.0 
% within COMMENT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 10.  The level of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence 
x  Comment Cross-Tabulation after gun partisans read blog posting 
                                                 
26 “Adjusted residuals has been standardized and can be interpreted like a Z score. These adjusted 
residuals can be used to determine whether the difference between observed and expected frequencies 
for any given group is  significant”  (Aspelmeier & Pierce ,2009, p.200) 
27 Critical Z value for the .05 level of significance is 1.96. 
28 “If the crosstab table is a 2x2 table, then all of the adjusted residuals will have the same absolute 
value, but exactly 2 of them will be negative.”  






Figure 17b. Amount of comments as a function of the level of agreement between 
partisan opinion and content valence of blog posting  
in the issue of guns on campus 
 
 
Partisans’ Information Seeking Behavior  
 
Selective Exposure to Related Content 
 
               H5a: Partisans will be more likely to select related mainstream news that 
supports their opinion as compared to news opposite from their opinion. 
 
Mixed analyses of between and within subjects ANOVA were conducted to test H5a. 
Between-subjects factor was partisan opinion either supporting or opposing the issue 
and within-subject factor was related news either supporting or opposing the issue. 
There was a significant main effect of partisan opinion on their willingness to read 
related news (F (1, 58) = 15.89, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .22), but there was no significant main 
effect of related news’ valence on the willingness (F (1, 58) = 3.14, p > .05). 
Interaction between partisans’ opinion and valence of related news was significant (F 
(1, 58) = 36.60, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .39). Pro partisans rated a higher willingness to read 




This difference was statistically significant (F (1, 32) = 23.48, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .42). 
Anti partisans showed a higher willingness to read anti-related news (M = 4.58, SD = 
.27) than pro-related news (M = 3.56, SD = .24). The difference was also significant 
(F (1, 26) = 18.47, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .42).  Figure 18a shows the differences. So, H5a 




Figure 18a. Gun partisans’ willingness to read related mainstream news as a 
function of partisan group and valence of related news. 
 
                 H5b: Partisans will be more likely to select related blog postings that 
support their opinion as compared to blog postings opposite from their opinion. 
 
Mixed analyses of between and within subjects ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of partisan opinion (F (1, 58) = 11.90, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .17) and valence of 
related blog posting (F (1, 58) = 6.07, p < .05, 𝜂2= .10) on their willingness to read 
further information. Interaction between partisan opinion and valence of related blog 
posting was also significant (F (1, 58) = 25.32, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .30). Pro partisans rated 
a higher willingness to read pro-related posting (M = 5.71, SD = .25) than anti-related 




20.16, p < .001, 𝜂2 = .41). Anti partisans showed a higher willingness to read anti-
related posting (M = 3.94, SD = .30) than pro-related news (M = 3.33, SD = .28). The 
difference was also significant (F (1, 29) = 5.44, p < .05, 𝜂2 = .16). Figure 18b shows 













Figure 18b. Gun partisans’ willingness to read related blog posting as a 
function of partisan group and valence of related blog posting 
 
 
Hostile Media Effect and Selective Exposure 
 
              H6a: Partisans exposed to mainstream news opposite from their opinion are 
more likely to seek more information supporting their position than partisans reading 
mainstream news congenial with their opinions. 
 
Two of one-way ANOVA were conducted to test this hypothesis. Results produced 
no significant difference between supporters reading pro-news (M = 6.25, SD = .19) 
and anti-news (M = 6.27, SD = .23) in their willingness to read pro-related news (F 
(1, 31) = 2.08, p > .05). However, opponents reading anti-news (M = 4.97, SD = .30) 
showed a higher willingness to read anti-related news than opponent reading pro-




𝜂2= .38), which indicated that partisans exposed to news congenial with their opinion 
may be more likely to seek more news supporting their position than partisans 
reading news different from their opinion. Therefore, H6b was not supported.   
                
               H6b: Partisans exposed to blog posting opposite from their opinion are 
more likely to seek more information supporting their position than partisans reading 
blog posting congenial with their opinions. 
 
Results of a one way ANOVA indicated a significant difference between gun 
supporters reading pro-posting (M = 5.12, SD = .35) and anti-posting (M = 6.16, SD = 
.30) in their willingness to read pro-related postings (F (1, 28) = 5.13, p <. 05, 𝜂2 = 
.16). Supporters reading anti-posting showed a higher willingness to read pro-related 
postings than supporters reading pro-news. However, opponents reading pro-posting 
(M = 3.84, SD = .41) and anti-posting (M = 4.05, SD = .44) demonstrated a generally 
same level of willingness to read anti-related postings (F (1, 28) = .12, p>.05). H6d 










Chapter 6 Discussion 
 
Summary of Results 
 
                  Based on the theory of hostile media effect, which posits that partisans 
perceive seemingly ‘balanced news’ as biased against their own opinion (Gunther et 
al., 2001; Choi et al., 2009), this study investigated whether partisanship influenced 
perceptions of two types of online content (mainstream online news versus blog 
posting) about two controversial issues (same sex marriage and guns on campus). 
More specifically, this study explored online content’s relative hostile media effect 
through which the two sides of an issue have divergent perceptions of content in a 
hostile direction (Gunther et al., 2002). The effect was explicated in terms of 
perceived bias, source credibility, author credibility, and content credibility. This 
study also examined the relationships between hostile media effect and partisans’ 
online behaviors including user commenting and subsequent information seeking.      
             The first research question examined how partisans’ opinions influence their 
evaluation of online news produced by professional journalists in terms of bias and 
credibility. In the case of same sex marriage, this study found strong evidence of a 
relative hostile media effect of mainstream news in partisans’ perceived bias, author 
credibility and content credibility. Overall, partisans with opinions congenial with 
mainstream news evaluated it as less biased but higher in author credibility and 
content credibility than partisans with opposing opinions. However, the level of 
agreement between partisan opinion and content valence did not appear to influence 




    For mainstream news about same sex marriage, supporters and opponents 
indicated the same level of source credibility regardless of content valence read. The 
mainstream source was rated as believable and trustworthy by all partisans.  
            In the case of guns on campus, mainstream news also produced a relative 
hostile media effect in perceived bias, source credibility, author credibility and 
content credibility. Unlike same sex marriage partisans, however, gun partisans’ 
evaluation of source credibility of mainstream news appeared to correlate with the 
level of agreement between their opinion and content valence. Gun partisans with 
opinions congenial with the content’s valence evaluated the mainstream source as 
more credible than partisans with opinions opposite of the content.   
   This study’s second research question was how partisans’ opinions influence 
their evaluation of blog posting produced by non-journalists in terms of bias and 
credibility. Results suggest that the blog postings also produced relative hostile media 
effects in perceived bias, source credibility, author credibility, and content credibility 
for both same sex marriage and gun partisan groups. Specifically, partisans with 
opinions congenial with blog posting rated the posting as less biased but higher in 
source credibility, author credibility, and content credibility than partisans with 
opinions opposite from the posting. It is noteworthy that, unlike the mainstream news 
that produced no relative hostile media effect in source credibility among same sex 
marriage partisans, blog posting generated the effect in source credibility for both 
partisan groups of same sex marriage and guns on campus. In other words, the level 
of agreement between partisan opinion and content valence of blog posting appeared 




Partisans with opinions congenial with blog posting evaluated the blog as a more 
credible source as compared to partisans with opinions opposite from the posting.  
              The third research question asked how sources and partisans’ opinions 
influence their evaluation of identical content from a blog and a mainstream news 
source in terms of bias and credibility. In the case of same sex marriage, source 
(mainstream media versus blog) did not appear to influence partisans’ evaluations of 
bias, author credibility, or content credibility. Instead, the level of agreement between 
partisan opinions and content valence significantly influenced the evaluations. 
Therefore, regardless of source, partisans with opinions congenial with the content 
perceived the content as less biased, and ranked it significantly higher in both author 
and content credibility than partisans with opinions opposite from the content. For 
example, supporters of same sex marriage evaluated pro-same sex marriage content 
from mainstream media as less biased and higher in author credibility and content 
credibility than opponents who read identical blog content. Conversely, opponents of 
same sex marriage evaluated anti-same sex marriage blog content as less biased and 
higher in author credibility and content credibility than supporters who read the same 
content on mainstream media.  
              At the same time, same sex marriage partisans’ evaluation of source 
credibility produced a different picture. Source appeared to influence partisans’ 
perceptions of source credibility. Specifically, even though same sex marriage 
partisans read identical content on both mainstream media and blog, partisans 




               Similar to the case of same sex marriage, source did not appear to influence 
gun partisans’ evaluations of bias and content credibility. Regardless of source, 
partisans with opinion congenial with the gun content perceived the content as less 
biased and ranked it significantly higher in content credibility than opposing 
partisans. In other words, supporters of guns on campus evaluated pro-gun content 
from mainstream media as less biased and ranked it higher in content credibility than 
opponents who read identical content on a blog. Conversely, opponents evaluated 
anti-gun content on a blog as less biased and ranked it higher in content credibility 
than supporters who read the same content on mainstream media. 
               However, a source appeared to influence gun partisans’ evaluations of both 
author and source of content. Even though gun partisans read identical content, they 
evaluated the mainstream media as a more credible source than the blog. In addition, 
for identical content from journalists and bloggers, gun partisans perceived 
professional journalists to be more credible than bloggers.       
                 The fourth research question asked how partisan opinions influence users’ 
commenting behavior.  For both issues in content from both sources, there was a 
significant relationship between the levels of agreement between partisan opinions 
and content valence, and commenting behavior. Sixty-five percent of partisans for 
two issues did not comment on the content read, but 35% of the partisans did. The 
majority of partisans who did comment had opinions opposite from the content’s 
valence. The minority of partisans had opinions congenial with the content’s valence. 
In sum, regardless of source (mainstream media versus blog), partisans with opinions 




supporting their opinion, which suggests hostile media effects motivate partisans to 
comment on content read.     
               The fifth research question explored the influence of partisans’ opinion on 
their further information seeking behavior. After reading mainstream news and blog 
postings about both issues, partisans were more likely to select content supporting 
their position than content opposite from their opinion. These results confirm 
partisans’ selective exposure to related content after reading mainstream news or blog 
posting.   
             The sixth and final research question investigated how partisans' perceptions 
of content influence their information seeking behavior. Partisans reading same sex 
marriage news with a valence opposite from their opinion did not show a higher 
willingness to seek related news supporting their opinion than partisans who read 
news supporting their opinion. In the same vein, there was no significant difference 
between partisans who read pro- and anti-same sex marriage blog posting in their 
willingness to seek related blog postings supporting their own opinion.  
   In the case of guns on campus, partisans reading pro or anti information on a 
mainstream source showed the same level of willingness to read related news 
supporting their opinions. However, gun supporters reading an anti-gun blog posting 
showed a higher willingness to seek pro-gun information than gun supporters reading 
a pro-gun blog posting. Opponents reading pro-posting and anti-posting indicated 
almost same level of willingness to seek anti-issue information. Given that the 
previous evidence that partisans reading disagreeable content are more likely to 




this study suggests that hostile media effects do not enhance partisans’ selective 
exposure to related content on the web. 
Theoretical Implications 
 
              This study produced several theoretical implications for the hostile media 
effect. No known study has investigated hostile media effect in the context of blog 
versus mainstream media. Results from this study suggest that similar to the relative 
hostile media effect of mainstream news, user generated blog content can also 
produce the effect. To date, previous studies only compared content produced by a 
professional journalist versus non-journalist, such as a student essay (Gunther et al., 
2006; Gunther et al., 2009; Schmitt et al., 2004). These researches did not find a 
significant hostile media effect for identical content presented as a composition 
produced by a student. The effect was found only when the author was a journalist or 
the content was professionally produced news. The researchers concluded that “the 
hostile media effect is peculiar to the mass media context” (Gunther et al., 2006, 
p.463). This study extends the literature by finding the effect in the context of user-
generated blog content.  
   Perceived reach has been regarded as an important predictor of hostile media 
effect. According to Gunther et al. (2009), content perceived to have limited reach 
produced biased assimilation which an individual’s tendency to find reported 
information supportive, rather than opposed, to an individual’s position (Lord et al., 
1979), whereas content perceived to have high reach (i.e. mass media) generated a 




relatively unfavorable bias with increasing levels of reach” (Gunther et al., 2009, 
p.755).      
               Arguably, the Internet places user-generated content in a different context, 
making it available to a potentially large audience. Therefore, if a student essay is 
posted on a blog online, it could be perceived to reach a large audience beyond a 
classroom. Results of this study suggest that even though the blog posting was not 
presented as content produced by a professional journalist or mainstream news 
source, the perceived reach of the blog – at least by the partisans tested in this 
experiment – appeared to generate a relative hostile media effect in the same way as 
previously tested mainstream news. 
              Previous hostile media effect studies focused on just partisans’ perceived 
bias. This study extends the literature by explicating relative hostile media effect in 
terms of source credibility, author credibility, content credibility as well as perceived 
bias. Blog postings about same sex marriage and guns on campus generated a relative 
hostile media effect in perceived bias, and the credibility of source, author, and 
content. Mainstream news about guns on campus produced the same effect. For 
mainstream news about same sex marriage, a relative hostile media effect was 
generated for perceived bias, author credibility and content credibility, but it was not 
generated for source credibility. Regardless of content valence read by same sex 
marriage partisans, a mainstream source was rated as a believable and trustworthy 
source by both supporters and opponents.   
              These results suggest that a relative hostile media effect of mainstream news 




issues. Same sex marriage partisans may be influenced, in part, by the long-time 
reputation of - or familiarity with - a professional news organization (i.e. AP News) 
when evaluating the credibility of the source. Conversely, gun partisans may base the 
credibility of a mainstream source on whether partisans agree or disagree with content 
valence not on the established reputation of the mainstream source.   
           This difference may relate to the relevance of the issue to partisans. To 
explain, when measuring partisans’ involvement with the two controversial issues 
tested, there were no significant differences in terms of familiarity with, prior 
knowledge of, or engagement with media coverage, or feelings toward the issues. 
There was, however, a statistically significant differences in the issue relevance to the 
partisans (F (1,131) = 4.113, p < .05, 𝜂2 = .03). Gun partisans indicated the issue 
more relevant to them (M=5.92, SD = .22) than same sex marriage partisans (M=5.29, 
SD = .22).  
              Relatively high issue relevance of guns on campus for partisans may result 
from partisans’ perception that guns on campus could have a direct effect on their 
personal lives, especially their safety, threatening anyone’s life. Such high relevance 
may make partisan opinions more important than the reputation of mainstream media. 
This suggests that the characteristics of an issue and its consequent relevance to 
partisans may influence the relative hostile media effect of mainstream news, 
especially in terms of source credibility.  
             Even though a few mixed results were found in this study, results suggest that 
mainstream news about some controversial issues may not generate a relative hostile 




constitute the overall perceived credibility of news content (Choi et al., 2006; 
Kiousis, 2001), a preexisting reputation of mainstream source such as the AP News 
may obstruct the relative hostile media effect in perceived credibility of mainstream 
source.   
   Unlike the mainstream news, however, a blog posting about both controversial 
issues tested produced a relative hostile media effect even in source credibility, 
providing some evidences that blog posting can produce a stronger relative hostile 
media effect than mainstream news. There are countless individual sources on the 
web without any preexisting reputation. Therefore, partisans may base their 
evaluations of individual sources (i.e. blog) on whether they agree or disagree with 
content valence not on the reputation of sources. If so, this means that mainstream 
news sources may mitigate a relative hostile media effect, whereas individual sources 
(i.e. blog) may enhance it.   
                   This study also explored behavioral consequences of hostile media effect, 
including the commenting on information and further information seeking. One 
previous study on commenting behavior (Hernando, 2007) employed self-reported 
survey data about the frequency of commenting, but this study enhanced ecological 
validity by measuring actual commenting by partisans on specific content. By doing 
so, this study provided empirical evidence of which partisans’ hostile perceptions 
predict commenting behavior. Partisans who experience hostile media effect are more 
likely to comment on mainstream news and blog postings than partisans who do not 




              By commenting, partisans express their perceived bias or disclose their 
‘disagreement’ with the content’s position. This was demonstrated by comments such 
as, “The bias in this article makes me think it is a joke. The reporter generalized many 
facts and some of the statements he made are false” and “The article is very one-sided 
against guns and provides no supporting arguments on either side” or “I disagree that 
same sex marriage is a biblical issue and should not be considered in the lawmaking 
arena.”  
   Partisans also tended to post additional information and personal experiences 
that amplify their opinions about the issue of same sex marriage or guns on campus. 
Sample comments include: “This article is lacking any real concrete data. Statistics 
from across the country consistently show crime rates to be lower in areas where rates 
of firearm ownership are higher” and “Although I am not gay, a great number of my 
friends are. I believe that love is love, and that it is ridiculous for society to say that a 
couple that is truly in love cannot be married because of their sex” or “It is written: 
Leviticus 18:22 . You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an 
abomination.”     
            Additionally, the finding that partisans reading content opposing their position 
commented more than partisans reading supporting content challenges traditional 
communication theory of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). This theory 
posits that people are less likely to voice their opinion if they feel theirs is different 
from the dominant opinion for fear of reprisal or isolation from the majority (Noelle-
Neumann, 1974). Noelle-Neumann (1974) asserted that mass media play a large part 




dominant opinion when reading mass media coverage. Results from this study may be 
the first to suggest that partisans who read online content with a valence opposite 
from their opinion were not always silent. Instead, users disclosed their 
‘disagreement’ with online content that expressed an opposite view. This might be 
explained by the new media environment, which provides an easy method for users to 
post comments anonymously.  
   Moreover, online users can more easily find and connect to like-minded 
individuals (Benkler, 2006). This may change the fundamental characteristics of 
‘disagreement,’ which were previously regarded as a minority’s opinion in 
mainstream media. Therefore, although the results of this study are limited to two 
controversial issues, they provide new reasons to revisit the spiral of silence in the 
online environment.       
               This study confirms partisans’ selective exposure by finding the tendency 
for partisans to select related content supporting their opinion after reading 
mainstream news or blog postings. This study also provides insights into the 
relationships between hostile media effect and the selective exposure. Previous 
studies (Arpan et al., 2011; Kim, 2010) produced mixed results for the same 
measures. Research by Kim (2010) showed that when exposing ‘neutral’ news to 
partisans, the hostile media effect was positively associated with selective exposure. 
Arpan et al. (2011) presented identity-threatening content or ‘neutral’ content to 
undergraduate students but did not find an association between perceived bias and 
selective exposure. Both studies seem to provide competing evidence about the 




be because Kim’s study failed to provide a condition in which hostile media effect is 
not produced, and Arpan et al.’s study tested college students instead of partisans who 
have varying levels of opinions on controversial issues.    
                The results of this study provide new evidence of no significant relationship 
between hostile media effect and selecting information supporting one’s opinion. In 
other words, a hostile media effect generated by content with a valence opposite from 
partisans’ opinion did not increase the willingness to seek more content supporting 
their opinion. Partisan opinions itself played a more important role in information 
seeking than the hostile media effect.    
Practical Implications  
 
                  Previous studies suggest little or no differences in participants’ evaluation 
of identical content on mainstream media versus blogs (Banning et al., 2007; Geer, 
2003; Mackey et al., 2007). This study extends the literature by suggesting if content 
about a controversial issue has a pro or anti valence, and partisans have a strong 
opinion on the issue, the evaluation of identical content displayed on different sources 
will vary depending on whether the partisans’ opinion is congenial with the content’s 
valence.   
               Even though partisans in this study were exposed to identical content on two 
different sources, they evaluated content supporting their position as less biased and 
more credible. Some partisans evaluated the content of the mainstream source as less 
biased and more credible than content on the blog. However, others evaluated blog 




on the web, while source did not influence partisans’ evaluation of bias and content 
credibility, whether partisans agree with the content’s valence did.       
                At the same time, the source appeared to influence partisans’ evaluation of 
source credibility in content about the two issues. Source also influenced evaluations 
of author credibility in the guns on campus content. Regardless of whether partisans’ 
opinion was congenial with content read, all partisans perceived the mainstream 
source as more credible than the blog. Moreover, gun partisans rated professional 
journalists as more credible than bloggers. This suggests that even though the content 
from mainstream source and blog generated a relative hostile media effect, partisans - 
regardless of their opinions - perceived a mainstream source as more credible than a 
blog and professional journalists as more credible than citizen bloggers. These 
measured perceptions of content, sources, and authors suggest new functions for 
and/or evaluations of the status of traditional mainstream media and journalists.  
  As noted, audiences are now capable of producing and distributing content on 
the web (Bruns, 2005; Benkler. 2006; Jenkins, 2009; Bowman et al., 2003; Gillmore, 
2006). In many cases, audiences have reported stories not yet covered by journalists 
of mainstream news organizations (Bruns, 2005; Benkler, 2006).  As a result, 
journalistic privilege previously enjoyed by mainstream media and its journalists are 
being threatened (Shirky, 2008). However, others argue that, despite obvious setbacks 
of mainstream media, new media do not yet displace the mainstream media (Jenkins, 
2006). This study’s evidence for the coexistence of mainstream media with emerging 
media included the audiences’ high level of source and author credibility for 




with a valence opposite from partisans’ opinions, the mainstream source and 
journalists were still rated higher in credibility than the blog and citizen bloggers. 
Audiences’ high levels of perceived credibility of mainstream sources and journalists 
may reinforce their roles in the age of user-generated content. After all, atomized 
user-generated content from various social media (i.e. Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, 
blogs) can be collected by professional journalists (Papacharissi, 2010). Journalists 
can incorporate user-generated content as “a cohesive and complete news story” and 
then redistribute it using mainstream media networks (Papacharissi, 2010, p.157). 
This study’s finding of high credibility for mainstream source, professional 
journalists, and user-generated content, provides new opportunities for a collaborative 
media environment with “synergistic power of journalism” between journalists and 
users (Papacharissi, 2010, p.156).                       
 Democratic Implications  
 
              The results suggest that user-generated content may produce a stronger 
relative hostile media effect than mainstream news because it is posted on individual 
blogs, which typically do not have the same reputation as news organizations. Since 
the enhanced hostile media effect of user-generated content can influence audiences 
to dismiss unfavorable (but potentially informing content) as biased or non-credible, 
the effect may arguably prevent audiences from giving reasonable consideration to 
any content unfavorable to their position (Gunther et al., 2001). This may reinforce 
partisans’ prior positions on controversial issues such as same sex marriage or guns 




                Interactive online features, such as user comments, are expected to promote 
public deliberation for reaching consensus on controversial issues. However, this 
study found that partisans of controversial issues posted comments on content with a 
valence opposite from their positions rather than content congenial with their 
positions. Many comments intended to correct perceived bias by amplifying one’s 
views. This implies that discursive activities motivated by hostile media perceptions 
may reinforce partisan opinions of controversial issues. If so, audiences’ discursive 
participations may result in more opinion polarization rather than consensus 
(Hernando, 2007). 
               Additionally, partisan audiences’ selective exposure to related content 
supporting their position may enhance their opinions. Refusing to be informed of 
different opinions or arguments increases the chances for a so-called ‘echo chamber 
effect’ of online content, which enhances opinion polarization online (Lyengar 
&Hahn, 2009).  
    In terms of the role of the application of these results to a democracy, we 
already know that the common place for deliberation is the public sphere (Habermas, 
1989).  Habermas’ concept of public sphere refers to a state of deliberation and not 
any actual ‘place’ (Papacharissi, 2010) and the Internet has been recognized as a 
networked public sphere (Benkler, 2006). Whatever one sees and thinks can be 
discussed on the networked public sphere (Benkler, 2006). However, according to 
Papacharissi (2010), the networked public sphere is not the same as the traditional 




traditional public sphere model does not apply to the online environment, which is a 
network of “liquid and reflexive” individuals (p.162).  
                  In Habermas’ public sphere model, rational consensus-driven deliberation 
was regarded as the ideal for communication and democracy (Karppinen et al., 2008). 
Instead of the traditional public sphere model, Papacharissi (2010) explained the 
democratizing effect of the Internet using Mouffe’s concept of ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
which is based on antagonism which is “the tendency to classify ourselves and others 
in terms of them and us” (Karppinen et al., 2008, p.7).  Mouffe (2000) asserts that 
rational consensus cannot be reached in a pluralist democracy in that consensus 
brings about some kinds of exclusion. For Mouffe, rational consensus is the kind of 
illusion. Mouffe (2000) proposed the concept of agonistic pluralism as an alternative 
to the public sphere by revealing “the impossibility of establishing a consensus 
without exclusion” (p.105).  Mouffe claimed that consensus aimed at reconciling 
tensions and conflicts neglects “the inherently conflictual nature of modern 
pluralism” (Mouffe, 2000. p.105). According to Mouffe (2000), the multiplicity of 
voices of pluralist societies can be manifested in agonistic pluralism rather than 
public sphere model.  
               Even though the Internet provides diverse information and networks for 
deliberation, results from this study suggest that partisan audiences tend to perceive 
information or opinions different from their position as biased and non-credible, and 
will select more content supporting their position. Moreover, partisans seem to 
participate in deliberation for amplifying their opinions. Partisans seem to be less 




partisans’ hostile perception of user-generated content (i.e. blog postings, videos of 
YouTube), and discursive participations motivated by the hostile perceptions (i.e. 
online discussion boards), may lay the foundation for agonistic pluralism rather than 
the traditional public sphere. If this is true, agonistic pluralism on the web may 
reinforce the democratizing effect of the Internet in that it contributes to “enhance 
democracy by decentralizing public sphere’s core and opening it up to disagreement, 
rather than agreement” (Papacharissi, 2010, p.161). 
          Limitations   
               Like any experimental study, this one is not without limitations. Unlike a 
controlled lab experiment, an online environment cannot confirm each participant’s 
identity. Since participants had unlimited time to complete the session, there is no 
way to confirm that every participant completed the experiment without assistance 
from others or that participants did not engage in concurrent  (i.e. potentially 
distracting) activities. Also, since nearly half of the sample was college-aged 
participants, results of this study cannot be generalized to the general public. 
               In this study, the Associated Press represented one mainstream media source 
and one citizen-produced blog represented a user-generated source on the web. 
Therefore, the results from this study cannot be generalized to all mainstream media 
and user-generated sources.  
              This study tested only two controversial issues. The sample for same sex 
marriage contained more female than male participants. Conversely, the sample for 
guns on campus contained more male than female participants. The unequal gender 




               Samples in this study included mixed partisans with or without membership 
in groups with known positions on the controversial issues. Even though all partisans 
reported an extreme opinion on the issues, participants with group membership could 
have had different perceptions of the content than participants who were not group 
members. Analyses did not differentiate participants in terms of group membership, 
which could have been a limitation of this study.  
              Since participants were randomly assigned to one of two content, supporting 
or opposing their own position, participants read only one content with a valence (pro 
or anti). According to Reeves & Geiger (1994), a single message may influence 
particular factors that could provoke participants’ responses. The scholars 
recommended use of ‘more than one message’ in most mass communication 
experiments. Therefore, this study’s use of one stimulus of each valence is a possible 
limitation. Future study could employ multiple stimuli with supporting or opposing 
views to further investigate hostile media effect in the context of diverse online 
content.    
               Moreover, participants of this experiment were asked to read specific and 
manipulated content without any other choices. In reality, online audiences are free to 
select content on the web. Future study could enhance ecological validity by 
providing participants with the freedom to choose content (Mende, 2008).  
  Two levels of content stimuli, supporting or opposing each issue, were 
manipulated, but no claims can be made about whether the variances of stimuli about 
two issues were homogeneous. In other words, even though two stimuli regarding 




(supporting or opposing), the two stimuli may still contain different variance in their 
levels of support or opposition for the issue, which would limit the comparison of 
issues. 
 In terms of the measures of user comments, only 35% of participants 
commented on the content read. This sampling may be too small to provide sufficient 
statistical power for reliable inferences about commenting behaviors (Hinkle et al., 
2003). 
             Also, this study measured participants’ willingness to read more related 
content after reading previous content. In the online environment, related content is 
typically provided as hyperlinks. Measuring an actual ‘click stream’ of hyperlinks to 
related content may have provided a more valid measure of information seeking.     
Directions for future research 
 
             There are several directions for future research. Studies could replicate the 
findings in this study by testing other controversial issues using user-generated 
content of other social media.  
         Content produced by journalists and web users is easily shared through social 
media networks such as friends of Facebook or followers of Twitter. Future research 
could focus on the relationships between audiences’ prior opinions toward 
controversial issues, hostile media effect, and content distribution by analyzing the 
sharing of varying content on social media networks.  
             This study investigated commenting behavior in an experimental setting. 




such as a site of the New York Times. This would provide more valid data about the 
relationship between hostile media effect and commenting behavior.  
             In addition, there are many kinds of discursive activities online including 
discussions on Facebook, Twitter, and political discussion boards. Future study could 
analyze specific arguments and counter-arguments to examine whether discussions 
contribute to reach consensus or reinforce partisanship. This would provide a clearer 
picture of the democratizing effect of new media.         
            Finally, future research could explore the roles of hostile media effect in 
social movements. For example, the hostile media perception, consequent 
commenting, and selective exposure to content may trigger the formation of networks 
for those with the same opinion about controversial issues. According to Mutz (2006), 
the heightened exposure to information reinforcing audiences’ positions and the 
connection with those who have similar opinion encourage higher level of 
participation in social movement. Like-minded networks on the web may “lower the 
costs of bringing people into corrective action, induce confidence that they are not 
alone, and give broader meaning to their claims” (Tarrow, 1998, p.23).  
  Conversely, heterogeneous networks discourage the participation (Mutz, 
2006).  The researcher stated that when people have opposing views within a 
network, they tend not to politically participate for the fear of alienation. 
Heterogeneous networks help its members to “avoid taking potentially controversial 
positions and pressure from those who might attempt to change their minds” (Mutz, 




content encourages the formation of like-minded networks and how the networks can 
play a distinct role in partisans’ involvement with social movement.    
Conclusions 
 
The emergence of web has provided virtually anyone with the opportunity 
for publishing their own content (Shirky, 2008). Therefore, it is true that an 
unimaginable amount of content with diverse perspectives are created and 
disseminated globally. At the same time, audiences have ample chances to access an 
overwhelming amount of content with various perspectives about issues, which may 
have not been extensively covered by traditional mainstream media.  
This study explored how partisan audiences perceive online content with 
different perspectives from different sources using the theoretical framework of 
relative hostile media effect (Gunther et al., 2001).  
The first research question of this study was to investigate a possible relative 
hostile media effect of mainstream news online. Indeed, a mainstream news online 
generated a relative hostile media effect similar to the effect measured from 
traditional printed news articles and national network broadcasts. 
The second research question explored a possible relative hostile media 
effect of a user-generated blog posting. Again, a blog posting produced by a non-
journalist appeared to generate a relative hostile media effect similar to the 
mainstream online news. In fact, user-generated blog content seemed to produce a 
stronger relative hostile media effect than the mainstream online news. Arguably, this 
enhanced relative hostile effect of user generated content could contribute to 




These findings suggest that even though partisan audiences can access 
various content online, it does not appear that the partisans give equal consideration 
to all content. Instead, partisans perceived content in the context of whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the content’s valence. Partisan audiences evaluated content 
opposite from their points of views as biased and less credible, which could further 
reinforce their partisanship.  
The third research question investigated partisans’ evaluations of identical 
content from different sources. Even though both the mainstream news and user-
generated blog posting produced a relative hostile media effect, partisans perceived 
the mainstream source and professional journalist as more credible than a blog and a 
blogger. These results could pave the way for a more collaborative media 
environment in which user-generated content is reproduced by journalists and 
redistributed by mainstream sources (Papacharissi, 2010).    
In addition to partisans’ perceptions of content, this study also investigated 
behavioral consequences of hostile media effects, such as users’ commenting and 
further information seeking following exposure to controversial content online.    
A fourth research question examined the relationship between a hostile 
media effect and the commenting behavior of partisans. To some extent, hostile 
perceptions of content from both mainstream news source and blog appeared to 
influence audiences’ commenting behaviors. Some partisans were motivated to 
comment on content opposing their position to correct a perceived bias and/or 




               The study’s fifth research question was to confirm selective exposure to 
related content after reading mainstream news or a blog posting. The results revealed 
that most partisans selected related content supporting their own position, confirming 
the behavior of selective exposure.   
               The sixth and final research question tested the relationship between a 
hostile media effect and selective exposure to related content. Hostile media effects 
did not appear to enhance the tendency for selective exposure to related content. 
Regardless of their perceptions of mainstream news or blog postings (hostile or not), 
partisans selected additional content supporting their positions.   
In their totality, the results from tests of a possible relative hostile media 
effect of online content, commenting and more information seeking behaviors 
following exposure to the content seemed to reinforce partisanship rather than 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix E:Post Survey Questionnaire 
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